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ABSTRACT
The U.S. higher education market grew substantially between 2005 and 2015,
with an increase in the number of programs offered of 13% and an increase in
annual graduations of nearly 30%. Can government policy significantly impact
student and college decisions? Does this market respond to occupation-specific
growth? Are for-profit colleges more responsive to changes in demand? I shed
light on these questions in this dissertation.
In Chapter 1, I estimate the impact of federal oversight on enrollment
and completions at for-profit colleges. For-profit colleges experienced a 33%
enrollment decline between 2010 and 2015 following an increase in federal
oversight. Did oversight cause this decline? I assess the causal effect of two
policies on for-profit enrollment: a significant report on misleading for-profit
recruiting, and threatened federal student aid sanctions on under-performing
colleges. I use a difference-in-difference framework that exploits the differential
exposure of a treatment group to each policy. For the report, treatment is
based on the presence of a local alternative; for sanctions, it is based on a debt-
to-income threshold. Both policies significantly contributed to the enrollment
decline: The report caused a 45% enrollment decline over 5 years at for-profit
colleges with a nearby alternative, while the threat of sanctions led to a 121%
enrollment decline at for-profit colleges below the performance threshold.
iv
In Chapter 2, I estimate the causal response of graduations and programs
offered to new licensing requirements. Using a difference-in-difference frame-
work, I exploit state-level variation in new licensing statutes. I find that new
licenses cause increases in both the number of graduations and programs of-
fered in fields related to the licensed occupations. I further show that new
licenses cause employment increases in college-level occupations and employ-
ment declines in low-education occupations.
In Chapter 3, I estimate program entry and exit due to labor demand
shocks across college sectors. I find that the number of public and private
non-profit Bachelor’s degree programs offered increases following an employ-
ment increase in related occupations. However, I find no evidence of a similar
response in the for-profit sector.
v
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1 The Effect of Federal Oversight on For-Profit
Colleges
1.1 Introduction
For-profit colleges in the United States experienced a dramatic 33% enrollment de-
cline between 2010 and 2015. This dwarfs the enrollment losses at public colleges over
the same period of just 3.9%. What caused these for-profit enrollment losses? Imme-
diately preceding the for-profit decline, the federal government enacted two pieces of
oversight of for-profit colleges: A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on
misleading for-profit recruiting practices and a program of federal student aid sanc-
tions on underperfoming for-profit colleges.1 The for-profit enrollment decline is often
attributed to these pieces of oversight, however the causal effect of each has not been
measured.
Determining the contribution of each policy is complicated due to their near simul-
taneous timing and other enrollment dynamics at play during this period. Further-
more, the ability of such oversight to substantially alter student enrollment decisions
and the operation of for-profit colleges is unclear. Prospective college students of-
ten hold incorrect beliefs and lack information regarding college costs and outcomes,
which a government report may not be able to significantly correct.2 Additionally,
1Graduates of these colleges often struggle to find employment (Deming et al. (2012)) and repay
student loans (Looney and Yannelis (2015)). Graduates also experience no improved labor market
outcomes over those provided by similar not-for-profit colleges, despite being more expensive to
attend (Cellini and Turner (2018), Cellini and Chaudhary (2014), Lang and Weinstein (2013), Liu
and Belfield (2014), Armona et al. (2019)).
2Incorrect beliefs about college costs and outcomes have been found to affect enrollment and
student aid take-up rates (Avery and Hoxby (2004), Booij et al. (2012), Barr and Turner (2018),
Bettinger et al. (2012), Wiswall and Zafar (2015), Wiswall and Zafar (2014)) as well as drive the
choice of major (Baker et al. (2018), Altonji et al. (2016)).
1
no colleges lost access to federal aid — they were only exposed to the threat of sanc-
tions.3 With the Department of Education recently ending the sanctions program and
increasing the information provided to prospective college students, whether under-
performing and expensive for-profit colleges continue to decline or experience an en-
rollment recovery will depend on the relative effect of these policy tools.
I estimate the causal effect of the GAO report and the threat of federal aid
sanctions on for-profit college enrollment and graduations. I exploit college- and
program-level variation in exposure to each piece of federal oversight in a difference-
in-differences framework. For-profit exposure to the GAO report is based on the
ability of students to attend a local not-for-profit alternative college. Exposure to
the threat of sanctions is determined by graduate debt-to-earnings ratio thresholds. I
find that the GAO report caused a 44.8% enrollment decline over 5 years at for-profit
colleges with a local alternative, while the threat of sanctions led to a 120.6% greater
enrollment decline over 3 years at for-profit colleges with a failing debt-to-income
ratio than those with a passing ratio.
The GAO report detailed the findings of an undercover investigation into for-profit
colleges. The release of the report and the extensive media coverage that followed in-
formed students of the deceptive recruiting practices used by many for-profit colleges
to hide the high costs and poor outcomes students face. This provided a negative rep-
utation shock to for-profit colleges and revealed that not-for-profit colleges are often
a better investment. In response, some current and prospective for-profit students
may have searched for a desired degree at a less-expensive alternative not-for-profit
college. For-profit colleges and programs are thus exposed to the GAO report through
the ability of students to switch to a nearby, less expensive and selective alternative. I
3Under previous government sanction programs, for-profit colleges that receive sanctions have
experienced enrollment losses (Cellini et al. (2016), Darolia (2013)).
2
estimate the causal effect of differential exposure to the GAO report as the difference
in enrollment between for-profit colleges with alternatives and those without alterna-
tives before and after the release of the report. Consider ITT Technical College and
the University of Phoenix, two high-profile for-profit colleges. In Madison, WI, the
ITT Tech campus offers 2-year degrees for $17,000 per year, while the University of
Phoenix campus offers 4-year degrees for $11,000 per year. Students and applicants
to ITT Tech have a local alternative: Madison Area Technical College, a local public
college offering comparable 2-year degrees for less than a fifth of the price of ITT
Tech. Students of the University of Phoenix have no such alternative however, as the
only local colleges offering similar 4-year degrees are more expensive or more selective
than the University of Phoenix.4 With no substitute college available to students,
the University of Phoenix in Madison is far less exposed to the GAO report than ITT
Tech.
The Department of Education’s Gainful Employment (GE) program threatened
under-performing for-profit colleges with federal student aid sanctions. Under this
program, college programs were given a grade based on average graduate debt-to-
earnings ratios. Students attending a failing for-profit program were not eligible for
federal student loans and grants. The GE program was announced in July of 2010
with preliminary grades released in July of 2012, however no sanctions were ever
imposed before the program was cancelled in 2019. Thus enrollment declines caused
by this program occur only from the threat of sanctions. Since losing federal aid
eligibility strips for-profit colleges of their main source of revenue, non-passing for-
profits may take action to improve graduate outcomes upon receiving a preliminary
non-passing grade.5 To do so, colleges admit fewer students in struggling programs
4These colleges are the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a selective public university, and Edge-
wood College, a private nonprofit with tuition of $21,000 per year.
5For-profit colleges are currently subject to the “90-10 rule” under the Higher Education Act,
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or eliminate these programs altogether, both of which would lead to a decline in
enrollment. Since the preliminary grades are released publicly, students may also
respond to the GE program by avoiding programs given a poor grade. Additionally,
for-profit colleges may act on private information on graduate outcomes following
the program announcement in 2010, before the grades were released. The causal
enrollment response to the GE program is the difference between non-passing for-
profit colleges and passing for-profit colleges before and after the GE preliminary
grades are released.
One complication to examining these two policies is that they occur nearly si-
multaneously and there is a large overlap between the treatment groups. Therefore I
estimate the responses to the GAO report and GE program jointly using a two-way
fixed effect model, allowing me to separate the enrollment response to each policy.
Additionally, I control for observable differences between the sets of treatment and
control groups that might bias the estimated treatment effects, such as the price of
tuition and state-level employment growth. I use a panel of colleges from the De-
partment of Education to estimate these effects. I also assess the response of college
completions (graduations) to each treatment at the program level.
I find that both pieces of federal oversight caused substantial enrollment and
graduation declines at treated for-profit colleges.6 The GAO report caused an 8.6%
enrollment decline in 2011 and the GE program caused a 25.9% enrollment decline in
2013. The effects grow over time, with the GAO report causing a 44.8% enrollment
decline by 2015. However, the threat of sanctions causes a considerably larger decline,
requiring that no more than 90% of a college’s revenues come from federal student aid.
6My results apply only to those for-profits eligible for federal student aid through the Title IV
program. Those ineligible are not threatened by sanctions, and the impact of the GAO report may
differ from that on eligible for-profits. Using state-level administrative data, Cellini and Goldin
(2014) study for-profit colleges not eligibile for federal aid. The authors find that the true number
of for-profits is twice that reported by the Department of Education, and that enrollment numbers
are 25-33% greater than reported.
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with a 120.6% greater enrollment decline at failing colleges than at passing colleges by
2015. At the program level, the GAO report caused a 37.4% decline in graduations
and the threat of sanctions caused a 45.9%decline in graduations by 2015. I find
that the initial response to each policy occurs along the intensive margin, while more
than three quarters of the long-term enrollment decline is driven by college closures.
These long-term results imply that the threat of sanctions is a more effective tool than
providing information for policymakers interested in lowering enrollment at expensive
and under-performing for-profit colleges.
My results serve as a lower bound of the full for-profit enrollment response to each
of these policies, as the control group for each treatment may also be treated. The
GAO report may cause some for-profit students to forgo college altogether and enter
the labor market. Both for-profits with and without an alternative may experience
an enrollment decline from this response. Similarly, for-profits passing under GE rule
may also be treated by the threat of sanctions if these colleges and programs take
precautionary actions that lower enrollment to decrease the risk of poor graduate
outcomes. For instance, a passing college might hesitate to open new programs or
expand class sizes under the GE rules. In each case, the control colleges and programs
may experience an enrollment decline that would not occur in the counterfactual un-
treated state. Therefore, the difference-in-differences between treatment and control
groups is likely smaller than the full effect on enrollment of each policy.
At the program level, programs passing under GE rules that are offered at a college
with a non-passing program may experience a completions decline as the college limits
general admissions or closes. I repeat the DD estimation with these passing programs
as an additional treatment group. I find a completions decline nearly as large as
that felt by non-passing programs. This response is mainly driven by the closure
of colleges where these passing programs are offered, furthering my interpretation
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that passing programs experienced a spillover effect when offered at colleges with
non-passing programs.
A classic threat to the causal estimation of a treatment using DD is confounding
trends in the post-treatment period. While I control for observable differences between
treatment and control groups that may cause differential post-treatment enrollment
growth, there may be additional unobservable confounding trends. For example,
since exposure to the threat of sanctions depends on student outcomes, one might
be concerned that a college with poor graduate outcomes may gain a reputation over
time for such outcomes, and thus increasingly struggle to recruit new students. In the
case of the GAO report, the existence of an alternative college may be correlated with
other enrollment trends independent of the GAO report. I find parallel pre-treatment
trends between each pair of treatment and control groups, providing evidence of no
such differential trends prior to the treatments and suggesting that no confounding
trends occur in the post-treatment period.
To further assess whether the existence of an alternative college is correlated
with confounding trends following the GAO report, I estimate the DD using public
colleges with and without local not-for-profit alternatives as the treatment and control
groups. One would expect no treatment effect at public colleges, as no negative details
regarding public college recruiting or costs were revealed in the GAO report. I find no
enrollment decline at public colleges with an alternative following the GAO report,
suggesting these confounding trends are not a concern. I repeat this analysis using
private non-profit colleges and find a small enrollment decline following the GAO
report. This is consistent with the GAO report also causing private students to look
for less expensive public colleges due to the high costs of private colleges discussed in
the report.
I estimate the aggregate contribution of these two pieces of federal oversight to
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the total enrollment decline of the for-profit sector. For this calculation, I assume
that in the absence of each treatment, treated colleges would have experienced the
enrollment trends of the untreated control colleges. Using the average enrollment of
the treated colleges as well as the number of such colleges, I find that these policies
account for 130% of the total for-profit enrollment decline between 2010 and 2015.
This implies that for-profit enrollment would have likely continued to grow in the
absence of the GAO report and GE program.
My results establish that the federal government has powerful tools to regulate the
for-profit higher education sector. In a market with imperfect consumer information,
it might be unsurprising that government provided information changes consumer
behavior. However, given the nature of the decision to attend college and the efforts
of some for-profits to mislead students, the magnitude of this response is less obvious.
I show that information provided by the government can substantially alter student
attendance decisions. This considerable response to the GAO report may be difficult
to replicate, however, as media coverage may have played a critical role in spread-
ing the details of the report. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the mere threat of
sanctions is enough to cause massive enrollment shifts in the for-profit sector. While
both policies resulted in significant enrollment declines, the GE program caused a
substantially larger loss of students at the worst performing for-profits.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe
recent college enrollment trends and detail the GAO report and GE program. I
describe the data used in Section 1.3 and the empirical approach to estimating each
effect in Section 1.4. In Sections 1.5 and 1.6, I detail the identification of treatment
and control colleges for the information and threatened sanctions effects, respectively,
and present the results of each estimation. In Section 1.7 I dicuss the aggregate results,
and in Section 1.8 I conclude.
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1.2 Background
College enrollment in the United States increased from less than 15 million students
in 1995 to over 21 million students in 2010.7 As shown in Figure 1.1, all three higher
education sectors experienced enrollment growth during these years, however the for-
profit sector more than doubled in size. By 2010, the share of college students enrolled
at for-profit institutions reached a high of 11%.
College enrollment grew most rapidly in the years immediately preceding this
peak. Between 2007 and 2010, public and for-profit enrollment increased by 1,650,000
and 830,000 students, respectively. Many changes to the higher education market
occured during this period. The Great Recession lowered the opportunity cost of
attending college as labor market conditions worsened, and also led to statewide
funding cuts for public colleges.8 Prior to the onset of the recession, the U.S. gov-
ernment raised the maximum federal student loan caps and eliminated the ability
to default on private student loans. Both of these policies increased the amount of
funds available for students to borrow and thus potentially expanded access to higher
education.9 Additionally, the number of for-profit colleges rose from 2,732 in 2007 to
3,194 in 2010. In contrast, there were only 18 new public colleges and 3 new nonprofit
colleges over the same period.
Overall enrollment has declined since 2010, with 1 million fewer students attending
college by 2015. While student losses occured at both for-profit and public colleges,
7Enrollment numbers are for colleges participating in Title IV federal student aid programs only.
8Poor labor market conditions have been found to increase college enrollment (Hubbard (2018),
Foote and Grosz (2017), Long (2014)). Funding cuts have been found to decrease attendance at
public colleges and increase attendance at for-profit colleges (Goodman and Volz (2019)).
9While previous studies have shown that lowering the costs of college through generous aid in-
creases the number of applicants, particularly for those from low-income backgrounds (Kane (1995),
Dynarski (2000), Deming and Dynarski (2010), Avery et al. (2006), Ionescu and Simpson (2016),
Linsenmeier et al. (2006)), borrowing constraints may not limit admissions substantially (Nielsen
et al. (2010)).
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the for-profit sector lost more than a third of enrollment, returning to 2006 enrollment
levels. In contrast, public college enrollment declined by 3.9% between 2010 and 2013,
and has remained near a total enrollment of 14.6 million students since then. Private
nonprofit colleges saw no such enrollment decline over this time. As a result of these
trends, the share of college students in the for-profit sector has fallen to less than 6%.
The large decline of the for-profit sector was preceded by an increase in federal
oversight. The Government Accountability Office report on for-profit colleges was
released on August 3rd, 2010, prior to the first academic year of enrollment declines
at for-profit colleges. The report detailed the findings of an undercover investigation
into 15 for-profit colleges in the US.10 Government agents, posing as prospective
students, applied to these colleges and recorded the efforts of recruiters to mislead
10The 15 for-profit colleges investigated were not named in the report, however they were revealed
in the subsequent Senate HELP Committee hearing.
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them about the costs and outcomes of attending the for-profit. The report claimed
that in some cases agents were pressured to commit fraud when applying for federal
student aid and forced to sign documents prior to receiving cost information.11 The
GAO report also compared tuition costs for a degree or certificate offered at for-
profit colleges to the cost for the same degree at not-for-profit competitors. At 14 of
the 15 for-profits investigated, tuition was more expensive than at a nearby public
alternative, regardless of program. In one example provided by the report, a web
page design certificate was found to cost $21,250 at a for-profit college, $4,750 at a
nearby private not-for-profit college, and only $2,037 at a nearby public college (GAO
(2010)).
The report was followed the next day by a Senate Health, Education, Labor, &
Pensions Committee hearing on the findings. The release and hearing were covered in
national news, with stories featured within 2 days of release in the Washington Post
and New York Times, as well as coverage by NPR, Rueters, CNBC, CNN, and the
Huffington Post. This national coverage described the efforts to mislead applicants
about the poor outcomes graduates face and the high costs of attendance. Some
outlets, such as the New York Times, repeated the findings of for-profit costs relative
to nearby alternative public and private not-for-profit colleges. Additionally, as shown
in Figure A.3 of Appendix A.3, Google searches for for-profit colleges spiked the day
the report was released, and remained high relative to earlier search frequencies in the
years after the report. This widespread coverage of for-profit practices and costs may
have provided current and prospective students with new information about for-profit
colleges.
11In November of 2010 a revised report was released by the GAO. This follow-up report amended
some examples of misleading recruiting practices to be less severe than initially reported. The
findings of the report remained largely unchanged, including the relative costs and outcomes of
graduates at for-profit colleges (GAO (2010)).
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In July of 2010, the Department of Education under the Obama Administration
announced the Gainful Employment (GE) program. Under GE rules, a for-profit
college program that fails to provide graduates with gainful employment loses access
to federal loan assistance for students. The Department measures gainful employment
using annual student loan debt payment-to-annual earnings ratios for the cohort of
students who completed the program two years prior to calculation. A passing ratio
is below 8% for annual earnings or below 20% for discretionary income, with the lower
of the two ratios used for the final GE status. A ratio above 12% for annual earnings
or 30% for discretionary income places a program into the failing category, while
ratios between passing and failing are given a “zone” or warning grade. Sanctions are
imposed on programs with a failing status for two out of three consecutive years.
The Department of Education released a preliminary set of program GE grades in
July of 2012. The status was calculated for all for-profit programs eligibile for federal
aid during the 2011 academic year, excluding programs with 30 or fewer completions.
Upon enactment of the GE rules in 2014, failing and warning programs would be
at risk of losing the main source of for-profit revenue if average graduate debt-to-
earnings ratios were not improved. One avenue to reduce these ratios is to limit
enrollment, particularly in poorly performing programs, and devote more resources
to fewer students. Another option is to eliminate non-passing programs entirely.
Furthermore, students may avoid attending these non-passing colleges following the
public release of GE statuses. These responses may occur following the public release
of the preliminary program grades in 20120, however for-profit colleges may have also
acted on private information following the program announcement in 2010.
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1.3 Data
The main data I use are a panel of college enrollment and completions provided
by the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS). The data set is a collection of surveys from all postsecondary
institutions participating in federal financial student aid programs each year. The
surveys provide college characteristics such as location, program length, selectivity,
enrollment, and tuition. The series used in this paper are available beginning in the
2002-2003 academic year. Of the 3,194 for-profit colleges responding to the survey
for the 2010-2011 academic year, I am able to determine exposure to the GAO report
and GE program for 2,220 colleges.
The Completions survey of IPEDS provides the number of completions at the
program level. For each college program, the number of Bachelor, Associate and Pro-
fessional degrees earned in each academic year are reported, as well as the number
of non-degree completions. The field of a program is identified using 6-digit Classifi-
cation of Instruction Programs (CIP) codes. At the 2-digit level, these programs are
categorized into general fields such as health, business, and education. I use these
data to match for-profit colleges with not-for-profit alternative colleges that offer
similar programs, as well as to perform a program-level analysis of the completions
response to the GAO report and the threat of sanctions. At the 6-digit program level,
I am able to determine the alternative status of 12,110 for-profit programs during the
2010-2011 academic year.
As detailed in Section 1.5.1, I use the commuting zone each college is located in
to find local alternatives to each for-profit college and program. I match institutions
to commuting zones using a 1990 county-to-commuting zone crosswalk provided by
Autor and Dorn (2013).
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To find colleges and programs at risk of federal student aid sanctions, I use the
2012 preliminary Gainful Employment report. This report provides the 2010-2011
academic year debt-to-earnings ratios and the corresponding GE status for each pro-
gram offered by a for-profit college. The Department found 538 for-profit programs
failing to meet the debt-to-earnings ratio requirements, 838 programs in the warning
category, and 10,734 programs passing. Debt-to-earnings ratios were not calculated
for the programs with fewer than 31 students, leaving 5,078 for-profit programs with-
out a status.
Lastly, I obtain employment data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The QCEW provides
quarterly and annual employment and wage data at the county, MSA, state, and
national level. I merge the state level annual employment data to the IPEDS data to
control for local labor market conditions when estimating the enrollment and com-
pletions responses.
1.4 Methods
I employ a differences-in-differences framework to estimate the causal effects of both
the GAO report and the threat of sanctions on for-profit enrollment and completions.
Each of these effects is identified as the difference in enrollment between treatment
and control groups before and after each treatment. For the GAO report, for-profits
in the treatment group are those with a nearby not-for-profit alternative. For-profits
threatened with sanctions are those with a non-passing GE status in the preliminary
GE report. I jointly estimate the effect of these two piece of oversight, as discussed
in this section. I provide further detail on each identification strategy separately in
Sections 1.5.1 and 1.6.1.
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I estimate the difference-in-differences using a two-way fixed effects model. This is
a generalization of the classic two-period, two-group difference-in-differences design,
allowing for the estimation of each effect over multiple lead and lag periods, as well
as for controls for time-variant covariates. This provides a natural way to test for
parallel pre-treatment trends, an identifying assumption discussed further below, and
to observe the long-term enrollment and completions response to each treatment.
The model also allows for differing intensities of the treatment and responses to the
treatment across multiple treatment groups.
I estimate the following equation:








i +Xi,tβ + εi,t (1)




i are indicators for
belonging to the treatment groups for each policy, αi and λt are college and time
fixed effects, and Xi,t is a set of covariates over time.
12 When estimating the response
of completions at the program level, yi,t is log completions at program i and αi are
program fixed effects. The coefficients of interest are δGAOt and δ
GE
t . For any period
t, the difference in enrollment between treatment and control group from t to the last
pre-treatment year τ is γt = δτ − δt.13
For the estimated effect to be a causal response to the treatment, the treatment
and control colleges must exhibit common post-treatment trends in the absence of
the treatment (Kahn-Lang and Lang (2018); Angrist and Krueger (1999); Angrist
and Pischke (2010)). Let y0i,t be the outcome for college i in the untreated state, then
12I estimate the response of log enrollment instead of levels, assuming that the response of enroll-
ment in levels varies with college-size, while the percentage response is consistent across college-size.
Treatment group indicators do not vary over time, as the treatment group is determined by exposure
at the time of treatment. See Sections 1.5.1 and 1.6.1 for further detail.
13Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level.
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the common trend assumption states that
E(y0i,T+1|Di = 1)− E(y0i,T |Di = 1) = E(y0i,T+1|Di = 0)− E(y0i,T |Di = 0) (2)
for post-treatment period T . This common trends assumption implies that there are
no confounding trends between the treatment and control group in the post-treatment
period, and therefore the estimated outcome trend differences between treatment and
control colleges during the post-treatment period are due to the treatment. While
these counterfactual post-treatment trends are unobservable, parallel pre-treatment
trends are suggestive of common counterfactual post-treatment trends. I estimate the
difference in enrollment trends between treatment and control groups for all available
years of data prior to the treatment to test for parallel pre-trends. However if there
is a linear trend in the pre-periods, then despite rejecting the null of non-parallel
pre-trends, the linear trend may bias the post-treatment estimates. To control for
such a trend, I estimate an additional specification








i +Xi,tβ + tD
GAO + tDGE + εi,t (3)
with the group-specific linear time trend controls tDGAO and +tDGE.
However, parallel pre-treatment trends are neither sufficient nor necessary for the
common trends assumption to hold (Kahn-Lang and Lang (2018)). There may be
additional confounding trends in the post-treatment period that are not observed pre-
treatment. To control for such confounding trends related to observable differences
between groups, I include time-varying covariate controls, denoted by Xi,t in Equation
3 (Donald and Lang (2007); Card and Krueger (1994); Bertrand et al. (2004)). The
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common trends assumption becomes
E(y0i,T+1|X = x,Di = 1)− E(y0i,T |X = x,Di = 1) =
E(y0i,T+1|X = x,Di = 0)− E(y0i,T |X = x,Di = 0)
(4)
The covariates I control for are cost of attendance, location type, typical program
length, and current and one-year lagged state-level employment growth.14 In Sec-
tions 1.5.1 and 1.6.1, I summarize these observable differences between treatment
and control colleges for each identification strategy in detail.
An additional identification assumption is that the treatment of one unit does not
affect the outcome of another unit. For this to hold, the untreated college must not
experience a change in enrollment due to the treated colleges receiving the treatment.
I discuss the feasibility of this assumption for each identification stratgey below.
1.5 The Causal Effect of the GAO Report
1.5.1 Methods
For-profit colleges and programs are differentially exposed to the GAO report through
current and prospective students’ ability to attend a local not-for-profit substitute.
The GAO report and subsequent news coverage provide details to current and prospec-
tive students on the misleading recruiting practices some for-profits use and the high
costs of attending many for-profit colleges. In response, students may look for and
attend a less-expensive alternative college option outside the for-profit sector. This
student response to the GAO report lowers enrollment and completions at for-profits
with an available not-for-profit alternative. Such a response does not occur at for-
14Location types are large city, midsize city, small city, suburbs, and towns or rural. When
estimating program level effects, typical program length is replaced with degree level.
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profits without an alternative, leaving these colleges and programs far less exposed
to the GAO report.
A not-for-profit college serves as an alternative to a for-profit college if it is nearby,
offers similar programs, and is less expensive and less selective than the for-profit
college. Consider two prominent for-profit colleges with campuses in Madison, WI:
ITT Technical College and the University of Phoenix. For-profit students often attend
college locally and may not be able to travel far or relocate to attend an alternative.15
Thus, following the release of the GAO report, students of these two for-profits may
consider attending not-for-profits in the Madison commuting zone. There are three
not-for-profit colleges in this commuting zone: the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Edgewood College, and Madison Area Technical College (MATC). The cost per year of
earning an Associate’s degree in computer information at the non-selective ITT Tech
is $17,000. At the similarly non-selective MATC, an Associate’s degree in computer
information costs only $3,300 per year. Students attending or considering attending
ITT Tech for such a degree could switch to MATC and save over 80% of the price
of tuition. However, the University of Phoenix offers only 4-year Bachelor’s degrees,
which are not offered at MATC. The typical student interested in a Bachelor’s degree
may not consider an Associate’s degree to be an acceptable substitute, therfore MATC
does not serve as an alternative to the University of Phoenix. Both UW-Madison and
Edgeworth College offer 4-year business degrees similar to those at the University of
Phoenix, however UW-Madison is a more selective college and Edgeworth is more
expensive, ruling these two colleges out as viable options for a typical University of
Phoenix students to attend. The University of Phoenix is therefore less exposed to
15For-profit colleges typically offer shorter programs, often with a vocational focus, that would
require non-local students to relocate for only a short period of time. In 2010, 80% of all for-profit
colleges offered 2-year or shorter programs and only 3% offered on-campus housing. Furthermore,
none of the for-profits in the 2010 IPEDS survey offered varying tuition rates for in-district and
out-of-district students.
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the GAO report than ITT Tech.
I exploit this college-level variation in exposure to estimate a causal enrollment
response to the GAO report. In the difference-in-differences framework, for-profits
with a local not-for-profit alternative serve as the treatment group, while for-profits
without alternatives serve as the control group. The IPEDS data allow for estimation
of both the enrollment response to the GAO report at the college level and the
completions response at the 6-digit CIP code program and degree level. I conduct
my analysis at both levels using for-profit colleges with a not-for-profit alternative
college and for-profit programs with a not-for-profit alternative program. I consider
programs in the same 2-digit CIP code field and at the same degree level to be similar
programs. For example, this allows all 2-year nursing degrees to serve as alternatives
to other nursing degrees, as these are all common to the health 2-digit code.16 The
causal enrollment response is the difference in enrollment between these groups before
and after the 2010 release of the GAO report.
This response serves as a lower bound of the full for-profit enrollment and com-
pletions response to the GAO report, since I capture only the differential response
between treatment and control colleges. Along with students forgoing for-profits for
not-for-profit alternatives, there may also be students who enter the labor market
instead of attending a for-profit following the GAO report. Such a student response
might occur at both for-profits with and without an alternative, thus both treatment
and control groups experience an enrollment decline from these students entering the
labor market. If this enrollment decline is independent of the existence of an alter-
native, it occurs equally between the groups. This portion of the student response to
16Matching programs at the 6-digit and 4-digit levels is too strict, as programs such as Registered
Nursing and Licensed Nursing are separated at these levels. I assume students would consider such
degrees substitutes if offered at the same degree level.
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the GAO report is then fully differenced out in the DD framework.17
One might be concerned that observable differences between treatment and control
groups are not independent of post-treatment enrollment trends. For instance, as
shown in Table 1.1, the treatment colleges are on average larger and more often
located in large cities. Enrollment at larger for-profit colleges or in big cities may
have started to decline post-2010 for reasons independent of the GAO report, biasing
the estimate causal response. Selection into the treatment is also a concern, as for-
profits in large cities are more likely to have an alternative and thus be exposed to the
GAO report. To remove the impact of such potential confounding trends, I control
for the observable differences between treatment and control groups over time with
covariate trend controls. I discuss these differences in detail below. As mentioned in
Section 1.4, the college covariates I control for are cost of attendance, location type,
and typical program length. Additionally, I control for local employment growth at
the state level to remove the effect of local labor market conditions on enrollment.
One might also be concerned there are trends correlated with having a not-for-
profit alternative that are independent of the GAO report. To determine whether
such confounding trends exist, I estimate the difference in enrollment between public
colleges with a not-for-profit alternative before and after the GAO report.18 Since
the GAO report did not reveal public colleges to be expensive or to mislead when
recruiting students, one would expect no difference in enrollment trends between
public colleges with and without alternatives post-2010. I conduct a similar analysis
using private nonprofit colleges, however the GAO may have also caused a decline at
17I control for observable differences between the groups which may also cause more students to
leave for the labor market, such as tuition price. If, conditional on these observables, this response
is not independent of the existence of an alternative, my causal estimate may either be smaller than
the full effect of having an alternative post-GAO report or will capture some of this response in the
estimate.
18I control for the same set of covariates as in the main specification.
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these colleges. While not the main target of the investigation, examples of private
nonprofits being more expensive to attend than public colleges were discussed in the
report. In Appendix A.2, I provide a difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis
using these not-for-profit colleges.
A final concern is that the control colleges and programs experience a spillover
effect from the treatment colleges being treated. This might occur if students leave
for-profits with alternatives and attend for-profits without alternatives instead. The
control colleges experience a gain in enrollment following the treatment that the treat-
ment colleges would not have experienced in the absence of the treatment. This biases
the size of the enrollment response I estimate to be larger than the true response.
While I cannot rule out a spillover effect, such an effect would require for-profit
students to switch to other for-profits upon receiving the negative news regarding
for-profits. Additionally, as shown with the example of ITT Tech and the Univer-
sity of Phoenix in Madison, the control colleges often offer programs not offered at
a nearby not-for-profit alternative and therefore not offered at treatment for-profits.
Thus the control colleges are often not alternatives to the treatment colleges.
I exclude both online and religious-focus schools when determining whether a for-
profit has an alternative. The location of an online college is unobserved, thus a
nearby alternative college cannot be identified. For the same reason, online colleges
are also not able to serve as local alternatives. My results therefore do not capture
enrollment declines at online for-profits caused by the GAO report. Furthermore,
students may leave both treatment and control for-profits for online not-for-profit
alternatives, which may bias my estimates. I define a college as an online institution
if it is classified as distance-only in IPEDS or if more than 50% of students are listed
as enrolled in online courses and not residing in the same jurisdication as the college.
For religious-focus colleges, a student may attend or avoid these colleges due to the
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specific denomination of the school, and a nearby non-religious or religious college of
a different denomination might therefore not be a viable alternative.
The treatment and control colleges differ across multiple characteristics. I sum-
marize for-profit colleges with and without not-for-profit alternatives and their differ-
ences in Table 1.1. At the release of the GAO report in 2010, I am able to determine
whether a for-profit has an alternative for 2,220 colleges out of the 3,194 for-profits
eligible for federal aid.19 Of this sample, 92% had a not-for-profit alternative. For-
profits with an alternative were larger colleges, with both a greater number of students
enrolled and more programs offered. I find that for-profits with an alternative were
more expensive to attend, costing on average $4,000 more annually than the control
colleges. The typical degree length offered was similar across groups, however 12%
of treatment for-profits were classified as 4-year colleges, compared to only 3% of the
control for-profits. Under GE rules, 28% of for-profits with an alternative offered a
non-passing program in the preliminary GE report, while only 12% of those with-
out an alternative offered a non-passing program. Lastly, I find that for-profits with
alternatives were more often found in large cities and less often in rural areas than
those without alternatives.
The 6-digit program-level treatment and control groups are similarly summarized
in Table 1.2. As with colleges, over 90% of for-profit programs had a not-for-profit
alternative in 2010, with an average of 1.6 not-for-profit alternative programs. The
treated programs were larger, with 41 completions compared to 25 completions at
control programs. Less than 15% of each group of programs were listed as either
warning or failing in the preliminary GE report. While over half of each group were
non-degree granting programs, a larger share of treated programs granted associate
19The existence of a not-for-profit alternative could not be identified for the remaining for-profit
colleges due to missing location or cost data.
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Total Cost of Attendance ($) 14,213 10,252
(6,272) (3,961)
2-Digit CIP Programs Offered 4.2 1.5
(4.7) (1.6)
6-Digit CIP Programs Offered 10.8 3.8
(11.9) (4.8)








Share by Selectivity (%)
Inclusive 97 100
Selective 3




Share by Location Type (%)
Large City 28 9
Midsize City 12 7
Small City 13 29
Suburb 36 11
Town/Rural 11 44
Note: Data are from IPEDS and the 2012 preliminary Gainful Employment report. The sample of
for-profit colleges are those for which the existence of a not-for-profit alternative could be deter-
mined and the Gainful Employment status could be identified, as detailed in Section 1.6.1
.
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degrees and the control group had a larger share of bachelor degree programs.
I plot the average of for-profit log enrollment and log completions over time by
treatment group in Figure 1.2 to visually compare trends before and after the 2010
GAO report. The GAO report release date of August 4th, 2010 occured at the begin-
ning of the 2010 academic year, and thus too late in the application and admission
cycle for students to react and attend alternative colleges. The 2011-2012 academic
year is the first year one would expect an impact on enrollment from the GAO re-
port. In the first panel of Figure 1.2, I compare trends between treatment and control
groups at the college level. While both treatment and control colleges experienced en-
rollment losses post-2010, enrollment at for-profit colleges with an alternative began
to decline 2011 while enrollment at those without alternatives did not decline until
2013. In the second panel I plot completion trends at the program-level. Completions
at treatment programs declined at a faster pace than control programs beginning in
2011 and continuing through 2016. I find evidence of parallel pre-trends between 2002
and 2010 in both plots, however the treatment colleges experienced faster enrollment
growth from 2007-2008. These raw trends suggest both that a decline occurred fol-
lowing the report and that the common trends assumption is satisfied.
1.5.2 Results
I plot the estimated causal response to the GAO report relative to 2010 in Figure
1.3 and present the coefficients in Table 1.3. The first panel of the figure shows
the college enrollment response, corresponding to the first column of Table 1.3. In
2011, for-profit colleges with alternatives experienced an 8.6% enrollment decline
from the GAO report, or an average of 41 students per treated college. This decline
grew to 20.3% per college in 2012, with a total decline of 44.8% by 2015. I find no
statistically significant differences in pre-treatment trends betweeen treatment and
23







Average Completions 41 25
(76) (56)








Share by Selectivity (%)
Inclusive 94 96
Selective 6 4




Share by Location Type (%)
Large City 29 20
Midsize City 13 13
Small City 13 23
Suburb 35 15
Town/Rural 10 29
Note: Data are from IPEDS and the 2012 preliminary Gainful Employment report. The sample of for-
profit programs are those for which the existence of a not-for-profit alternative could be determined
and the Gainful Employment status could be identified, as detailed in Section 1.6.1
.
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Note: The vertical line denotes the academic year the GAO report was released. The log trends are
demeaned relative to 2010 and with college and program fixed effects removed. The first panel
shows enrollment trends at the college level, while the second panel shows completions trends at
the 6-digit program level.
control colleges, with the exception of 2006-2007. These results hold when adding
group-specific linear trends, as shown in the second column of Table 1.3, with slightly
larger causal enrollment declines over time.
In the second panel of Figure 1.3, I plot the program-level completions difference-
in-differences. I find that for-profit programs with a not-for-profit alternative expe-
rienced a 13.4% completions decline in 2011, for an average of 5.5 completions. A
completions response in the same year as the initial enrollment decline is not surpris-
ing, since less-than-two-year programs account for 60% of treated programs. By 2014,
I find that the GAO report caused a total drop in completions of 37.4%. I find no ev-
idence of continued completions declines post-2014. The differences in pre-treatment
trends are not statistically significantly different from zero for all pre-treatment years
and the results hold with linear trend controls, again suggesting the common trends
assumptions is satisfied by the treatment and control groups.
While the immediate response of program-level completions in 2011 is greater
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Table 1.3: Effect of the GAO Report on For-Profit Colleges and Programs with
Alternatives
College Enrollment Program Completions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δt - δ2010
2005 -0.090 -0.002 -0.010 -0.020
(0.056) (0.042) (0.060) (0.056)
2006 -0.073 -0.003 0.018 0.011
(0.049) (0.039) (0.056) (0.050)
2007 -0.115** -0.063 0.009 0.003
(0.051) (0.043) (0.053) (0.052)
2008 0.000 0.035 -0.011 -0.014
(0.043) (0.039) (0.050) (0.045)
2009 0.024 0.041 0.000 -0.002
(0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
2011 -0.086** -0.104** -0.134*** -0.132***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.051)
2012 -0.203*** -0.238*** -0.152*** -0.148**
(0.059) (0.064) (0.058) (0.064)
2013 -0.249*** -0.302*** -0.178** -0.172*
(0.073) (0.078) (0.075) (0.087)
2014 -0.284*** -0.355*** -0.374*** -0.366***
(0.105) (0.109) (0.095) (0.113)
2015 -0.448*** -0.535*** -0.344*** -0.334***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.100) (0.123)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,332 28,332 133,912 133,912
R2 0.206 0.206 0.200 0.200
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the effect of the GAO report over time are the difference in log trends between
for-profits with and without alternatives, estimated using Equation 3. The covariate trends con-
trolled for are GE status, cost of attendance, location type, program length, and state-level em-
ployment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level.
26













































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the difference-in-differences between treatment and control colleges
and programs and between each year and 2010, estimated using Equation 3. The coefficients are
presented in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars
denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.
than that of college-level enrollment, the enrollment declines are greater post-2012.
A larger enrollment than completions response suggests the students leaving the treat-
ment for-profits were less likely to graduate than those who stayed. To further exam-
ine whether for-profit completions and enrollment responded differently to GAO re-
port, I estimate the response of aggregate completions at the college-level and present
the results in Figure A.4 and Table A.2 of Appendix A.3. I find similar results, with
evidence of a smaller decline in completions through 2015.
One might also expect the program-level response to differ from the college-level
response conditional on the share of students in treated programs per college. If the
typical for-profit with an alternative college has a low share of students exposed to an
alternative program, one would see a much greater decline at the program-level than
the college-level. However, of for-profits with an alternative, 89% had a 100% share of
completions in treated programs. Of those with less than a 100% share, the average
share of completions in treated programs was 80%. Thus, most students at treated
27
colleges were also in treated programs, and the size of responses at the program and
college level should be similar. This is consistent with the estimated effects shown in
Table 1.3, as the college-level and program-level coefficients lie within 90% confidence
intervals.
I examine whether the enrollment and completion responses occur along the inten-
sive margin or due to college closures. I reestimate Equation 3, this time using only
for-profit colleges that remain open through 2016. The estimates are presented in
Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4. I find a 6.9% decline in enrollment in 2011, 1.7 percentage
points smaller than the baseline estimate. By 2015 however, I find a total enrollment
decline of only 14.5%, nearly 30 percentage points smaller than the baseline estimate.
At the program level, I find an 11.0% completions decline in 2011, which grows to a
25.4% decline by 2015. These results suggest the initial enrollment decline occured
mainly at the intensive margin as students left for-profit colleges. However, nearly
three-quarters of the later enrollment decline occurred due to college closures. At
the program level, completion declines are similar to the baseline results when ex-
cluding college closures. As with the basline estimates, these results are robust to a
group-specific linear time trend.
The effects of having a not-for-profit alternative post-2010 on public and private
non-profit colleges and programs are presented in Figure 1.5 and Table 1.5. In the
left two panels, I plot the effect on public colleges and programs. I find no post-
treatment trend differences for public colleges, providing evidence of no effect of
having an alternative independent of the GAO report. At the program-level however,
I find evidence of a small increase in completions at public programs. As public
programs with an alternative are more likely to be located in a large city, they may
be more likely to be an alternative. This small increase in completions may be due
to for-profit students switching into these programs.
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Table 1.4: Effect of the GAO Report at Colleges that Remained Open
College Enrollment Program Completions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δt - δ2010
2005 -0.077 0.002 -0.074 -0.064
(0.057) (0.046) (0.059) (0.059)
2006 -0.081* -0.017 -0.046 -0.039
(0.047) (0.037) (0.052) (0.053)
2007 -0.045 0.003 -0.041 -0.035
(0.050) (0.042) (0.052) (0.055)
2008 0.000 0.032 -0.052 -0.048
(0.044) (0.041) (0.051) (0.049)
2009 0.033 0.049 -0.021 -0.019
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042)
2011 -0.069** -0.084*** -0.110** -0.112**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.048) (0.051)
2012 -0.107*** -0.138*** -0.116** -0.120**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.052) (0.060)
2013 -0.080* -0.128** -0.152*** -0.158**
(0.045) (0.054) (0.054) (0.069)
2014 -0.139*** -0.202*** -0.283*** -0.291***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.061) (0.084)
2015 -0.145*** -0.224*** -0.254*** -0.264***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.062) (0.094)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 17,273 17,273 106,053 106,053
R2 0.117 0.117 0.123 0.123
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the effect of the GAO report over time are the difference in log trends between
for-profits with and without alternatives, estimated using Equation 3, now excluding colleges that
close. The covariate trends controlled for are GE status, cost of attendance, location type, program
length, and state-level employment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone
level.
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Table 1.5: Effect of the GAO Report on Public and Private Nonprofit Colleges and
Programs
College Enrollment Program Completions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Private Public Private
δt - δ2010
2005 -0.032** 0.042 -0.016 -0.006
(0.015) (0.029) (0.013) (0.017)
2006 -0.020* 0.023 -0.012 0.002
(0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.015)
2007 -0.016 0.019 -0.019* 0.007
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014)
2008 0.000 0.008 -0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014)
2009 0.005 0.008 -0.000 0.020*
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011)
2011 0.005 -0.025 0.006 -0.013
(0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
2012 -0.007 -0.102** 0.035** -0.033*
(0.010) (0.041) (0.015) (0.019)
2013 -0.016 -0.090* 0.034* -0.026
(0.013) (0.054) (0.019) (0.021)
2014 -0.027* -0.097 0.052** -0.047**
(0.014) (0.073) (0.025) (0.022)
2015 -0.015 -0.157** 0.063** -0.051**
(0.016) (0.078) (0.029) (0.023)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,433 16,955 1,247,133 593,712
R2 0.071 0.052 0.011 0.022
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the effect of the GAO report over time are the difference in log trends between
treatment and control colleges and programs, estimated using Equation 3. The covariate trends
controlled for are cost of attendance, location type, program length, college size, lagged enrollment
and completions growth, and state-level employment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the
commuting-zone level.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010, estimated using Equation 3.
These coefficients are presented in Table 1.4. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-
zone level. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing
of the treatment.
In the right two panels of Figure 1.5, I plot the results for private nonprofit colleges
and programs. I find evidence of small enrollment and completions declines in this
college sector. Private nonprofit olleges with not-for-profit alternatives experienced
a 15.7% greater decline than those without alternatives by 2015. At the program
level, programs with alternatives experienced a 5.1% decline over this period. As dis-
cussed in Section 1.5.1, the private nonprofit college sector may have been negatively
impacted by the GAO report, since public alternatives were often highlighted as the
least expensive option available. These results are consistent with a small causal
response to the GAO report at private nonprofit colleges and programs.
1.6 The Causal Effect of The Threat of Sanctions
1.6.1 Methods
For-profit colleges and programs with a high average graduate debt-to-earnings ratio
are threatened with federal student aid sanctions. In the 2012 preliminary Gainful
31






















































































































































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010, estimated using Equation 3.
These coefficients are presented in Table 1.5. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-
zone level. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing
of the treatment.
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Employment report, for-profit programs were given a grade based on these ratios.
Colleges found to have a non-passing program in this report would have to improve
graduate outcomes in that program to avoid the loss of federal student aid when
the GE program is enacted. To do so, colleges could take actions such as more
selectively admitting students, reducing enrollment numbers in struggling programs,
or eliminating these programs altogether. These actions result in lower enrollment
and fewer completions in the for-profit sector. Additionally, since the preliminary
GE grades and debt-to-earning ratios were released publicly, students may have also
responded to the GE program by avoiding for-profits threatened with sanctions.
To estimate the for-profit college enrollment and completions response to the
threat of federal student aid sanctions, I establish college and program-level variation
in exposure to the threat of sanctions using the 2012 preliminary GE grades. The
preliminary GE report determines grades at the 6-digit program and degree level. As
detailed in Section 1.2, for-profit programs were given a passing, warning, or failing
grade. To measure exposure at the college-level, I assign GE status based on the worst
performing program offered at the college. This grading system provides a natural
measure of treatment intensity. While both failing and warning colleges and programs
may need to take action to avoid sanctions, failing for-profits need to improve out-
comes the most and therefore may take the strongest action to limit enrollment. In
the difference-in-differences framework, colleges and programs with warning or fail-
ing grades serve as the treatment groups, while those with a passing grade serve as
the control group.20 I estimate the difference in enrollment and completions between
these groups before and after the release of preliminary grades in 2012.
I estimate an additional DD specification using treatment intensity as measured
20The programs with fewer than 31 completions that were not graded and were not at risk of
losing federal student aid during the early years of the GE program. In my primary analysis, I
consider these programs to be passing and not threatened by sanctions.
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by the reported average debt-to-earnings ratios. Using the discrete GE grades as the
treatment intensity assumes that colleges and programs just above and just below the
failing or warning thresholds respond differently to the threat of sanctions. However,
one might expect programs near the thresholds to respond similarly, regardless of
grade, to lessen the risk of losing student aid in future years. For-profits with debt-
to-earnings ratios well above the failing threshold may also be likely to take stronger
actions than those just above the cutoff. Using the debt-to-earnings ratios as the
measure of treatment intensity allows for variation in responses within grades.21
Since exposure to the threat of sanctions is based on average student outcomes, one
might be concerned that poorly performing for-profits experience different enrollment
trends than passing for-profits independent of the GE program. These trends would
bias the estimated causal response to the threat of sanctions. For example, a college
with poor outcomes may gain a negative reputation over time, leading to enrollment
losses as students avoid this college. I test whether such confounding trends were
occuring prior to the treatment by comparing pre-treatment trends between the for-
profit groups. Parallel pre-trends are evidence that these confounding trends were
not occuring prior to the GE program. While this does not preclude the existence
of confounding trends in the post-treatment period, any such trends would have to
begin simultaneously or shortly after the GE grades are released.
An additional potential concern is that control colleges and programs may have
been impacted by the threat of sanctions. Despite a passing grade, colleges may
have limited admissions or eliminated programs as precautionary measures to avoid
being sanctioned. The threat of these sanctions may also have constrained growth at
these colleges, as the risk of poor graduate outcomes might increase after opening new
21However, since these ratios are not calculated for programs with fewer than 31 completions in
2011, this further limits the sample of programs and colleges.
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programs or expanding class sizes. The control colleges and programs would therefore
experience an enrollment decline or slower enrollment growth that the treated colleges
would not experience in the absence of the treatment. My results would therefore
be an underestimate of the full for-profit response to the GE program. However,
there might also be positive spillovers at control colleges if enrollment shifts from the
non-passing for-profits to the passing for-profits. Such enrollment shifts would cause
my DD specification to overestimate the causal response to the GE program.
I am able to assess whether a spillover effect occurs at passing programs offered at
a college with a non-passing program. I construct a second treatment group consisting
of these programs and reestimate the DD. These programs may experience an increase
in completions if students shift from the non-passing programs to passing programs
at the same school, due to either actions taken by the college or decisions made by
students. However, these programs might also experience a completions decline if
the college limits general admissions, closes, or if students avoid all programs at the
college.
I present summary statistics of passing, warning, and failing for-profit colleges as
of 2010 in Table 1.6. Of the 2,220 for-profit colleges for which the existence of an
alternative could also be determined, I find that 603 had a non-passing program in
the 2011 GE report, with 244 of those offering a failing program. Failing colleges had
an average of 2.7 failing programs and 2.2 warning programs, while warning colleges
had an average of 1.4 warning programs. The average debt-to-earnings ratio across
the assigned college-level grades are similar to the official program-level thresholds.
The average ratio at a failing college was 11.8%, just below the 12% threshold for an
individual program to be failing. Similarly, the average ratio was 7.4% at warning
colleges, slightly below the 8% warning threshold for programs. The 4% average ratio
at passing colleges was well within the passing category.
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Enrollment 899 619 341
(1,337) (618) (652)
Debt-to-Annual Earnings Ratio (%) 11.8 7.4 4.0
(4.3) (2.0) (2.1)
Total Cost of Attendance ($) 16,273 15,982 13,078
(6,405) (5,738) (6,087)
Programs per College 8.4 5.4 3.0
(5.7) (5.0) (3.7)
Warning Programs per College 2.2 1.4
(2.7) (0.8)
Failing Programs per College 2.7
(2.3)
Number of Colleges
Overall 244 359 1617
Share by Alternative Status (%)
No Alternative 5 3 10
Has Alternative 95 97 90
Share by Selectivity (%)
Inclusive 91 98 98
Selective 9 2 2
Share by Program Length (%)
4-year 36 16 6
2-year 48 44 30
<2-year 17 40 64
Share by Location Type (%)
Large City 32 31 25
Midsize City 11 10 12
Small City 15 12 15
Suburb 31 34 34
Town/Rural 10 13 14
Note: Data are from IPEDS and the 2012 preliminary Gainful Employment report. The sample of
for-profit colleges are those for which the Gainful Employment status could be identified and the
existence of a not-for-profit alternative could be determined, as detailed in Section 1.5.1
36
Failing and warning colleges were larger, more expensive, and longer in typical
program length than passing colleges. Average enrollment was 899 at failing colleges
and 628 at warning colleges, compared to 341 students at passing colleges. Total aver-
age costs were similar across the two treated groups at around $16,000 per year, while
passing colleges were $3,000 less expensive to attend. Nearly half of failing colleges
offered mainly 2-year programs and 36% offered 4-year programs. A similar share
of warning colleges were 2-year colleges, however 40% of warning colleges typically
offered less-than-2-year programs. In contrast, almost two-thirds of passing colleges
were less-than-2-year schools, with only 30% classified as 2-year colleges and only 6%
as 4-year colleges. There were observable similarities across these three groups, such
as location type, selectivity of admissions, and in the existence of a not-for-profit
alternative.
I summarize the 2010 characteristics of 6-digit program treatment and control
groups in Table 1.7. There were 538 failing for-profit programs, 838 warning programs,
and 10,734 passing programs in 2010. In each group, close to 90% of programs had
a not-for-profit alternative. Programs were also similar in size across statuses. The
differences in selectivity, location type, and degree-type mirror those found at the
college level.
In Figure 1.6, I plot the average log enrollment over the treatment period for
failing, warning, and passing is the first for-profit colleges and programs. Since the
preliminary grades are released in July of 2012, the 2013-2014 academic year is the
first post-treatment period. With the grades released only a month before the start
of the 2012-2013 academic year, one would not expect colleges to have had enough
time to adjust recruiting and admissions practices or students to have been able
to react to the grades. The left panel of Figure 1.6 shows that for-profit colleges
across all GE statuses experience an enrollment decline post-2012. The differences
37








Average Completions 41 42 39
(66) (69) (75)
Debt-to-Annual Earnings Ratio (%) 15.3 9.9 4.7
(2.9) (1.3) (2.3)
Number of Programs
Overall 538 838 10,734
Share by Alternative Status (%)
No Alternative 13 7 8
Has Alternative 87 93 92
Share by Selectivity (%)
Inclusive 90 92 94
Selective 10 8 6
Share by Degree (%)
Bachelor 27 13 11
Associate 48 41 29
Non-Degree 25 46 60
Share by Location Type (%)
Large City 35 30 28
Midsize City 11 11 13
Small City 17 14 14
Suburb 29 35 33
Town/Rural 8 10 12
Note: Data are from IPEDS and the 2012 preliminary Gainful Employment report. The sample of
for-profit programs are those for which the Gainful Employment status could be identified and the
existence of a not-for-profit alternative could be determined, as detailed in Section 1.5.1
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Note: The vertical line denotes the academic year the Gainful Employment program was proposed.
The log trends are demeaned relative to 2010 and with college and program fixed effects removed.
The first panel shows enrollment trends at the college level, while the second panel shows com-
pletions trends at for-profit 6-digit programs.
continue through 2016, consistent with the continuation of the GE program over this
period. Additionally, these raw trends provide some evidence of a faster decline at
failing colleges than at warning colleges. At the program level, I find evidence of a
faster completions decline at failing and warning programs by 2014, continuing again
through 2016.
1.6.2 Results
I report the causal response of for-profit enrollment and completions to the threat of
sanctions in Table 1.8 and plot the coefficients in Figure 1.7. The left panel of Figure
1.7 shows the enrollment response by GE grade, corresponding to columns 1 and 3
of Table 1.8. Failing for-profit colleges experienced a 25.9% enrollment decline in
2013 from the threat of sanctions, while warning colleges experienced a smaller 13.7%
decline. These effects grow over time, with warning and failing colleges experiencing
a 77.2% and 120.6% greater enrollment decline than passing colleges by 2015, respec-
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010, estimated using Equation 3.
These coefficients are presented in Table 1.8. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-
zone level. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing
of the treatment.
tively. The larger response at failing for-profits than warning for-profits is consistent
with failing colleges taking stronger action to limit enrollment and improve grad-
uate outcomes. The difference in college pre-treatment trends are not statistically
significantly different from zero with the exception of 2005-2006 for failing colleges.
However, my results are robust to linear time trends, as shown in columns 2 and 4.
The right panel of Figure 1.7 shows the program-level completions response to the
threat of sanctions by GE status. I find a 13.8% decline at failing programs in 2013,
however no statistically significant decline for warning programs until a 17.5% drop in
2014. Such a lag in completions declines relative to enrollment declines would occur if
for-profits limited admissions in response to the the threat of sanctions while allowing
currently enrolled students to finish their degrees. While there are some statistically































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using the average graduate debt-to-earnings ratio as the measure of treatment
intensity, I find a similar response to threatened sanctions as well as parallel pre-
treatment trends. I plot the enrollment and completions response in Figure 1.8 and
present the estimated coefficients in Table 1.9. Coefficients correspond to a 10%
greater 2011 debt-to-earnings ratio. In 2013, there was a 22.6% enrollment decline
at the college level. This grows to an 86.4% decline by 2015. At the program level,
I find that completion declines began in 2011 instead of 2013, prior to the release of
the GE preliminary grades. This is evidence of for-profits using private information
on graduate outcomes to respond to the 2010 proposal of the GE sanctions. By 2015,
programs with a higher debt-to-earnings ratio experienced a 51.7% greater decline
in completions. Given the average debt-to-earning ratios across GE grades, these
estimates are in line with the warning college estimates of Table 1.8, though smaller
than the estimated response at failing colleges. Since using the debt-to-earnings
ratio limits the sample to graded colleges and programs, I estimate the baseline DD
excluding ungraded colleges and programs. As shown in Figure A.6 of Appendix A.3,
I find no substantial differences from the baseline results.
Across these specifications, I find a smaller response by 2015 of completions at
the program level than of enrollment at the college level. This pattern holds when
estimating the college-level response of aggregate completions, as shown in Table A.3
and Figure A.5 of Appendix A.3. The smaller completions response may be due to
improving graduation rates as non-passing colleges admit fewer students. Assuming
a for-profit college has knowledge of student types, a non-passing college attempting
to improve graduate outcomes may limit admissions of those students most likely
to struggle post-graduation. These students may also be the most likely to struggle
in college, and therefore drop out at a higher percentage than other student types.
Fewer drop outs results in a higher graduation rate and a larger enrollment than
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Table 1.9: Effect of the GE Program on For-Profits by Debt-to-Earnings Ratio
College Enrollment Program Completions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δt - δomitted year
2005 0.027 0.034 0.005 -0.057
(0.080) (0.046) (0.082) (0.054)
2006 0.027 0.019 0.034 -0.021
(0.073) (0.043) (0.072) (0.057)
2007 -0.016 -0.020 0.077 0.034
(0.068) (0.040) (0.067) (0.054)
2008 0.003 0.003 0.108 0.080
(0.060) (0.041) (0.074) (0.064)
2009 0.074 0.066 0.047 0.030
(0.065) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046)
2010 0.026 0.027
(0.055) (0.047)
2011 0.032 0.029 -0.121** -0.103*
(0.045) (0.039) (0.053) (0.056)
2012 -0.201*** -0.173**
(0.062) (0.072)
2013 -0.226*** -0.205*** -0.272*** -0.235***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.070) (0.087)
2014 -0.485*** -0.450*** -0.307*** -0.260**
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.130)
2015 -0.864*** -0.840*** -0.517*** -0.456***
(0.243) (0.248) (0.146) (0.171)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 21,222 21,237 56,662 56,662
R2 0.218 0.216 0.251 0.251
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the threatened sanctions effect over time are the difference in log trends across
average graduate annual debt-to-earnings ratios, estimated using Equation 3. The covariate trends
controlled for are alternative-existence, cost of attendance, location type, program length, college
size, lagged enrollment and completions growth, and state-level employment growth. Standard
errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level.
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Note: Treatment intensity is the average graduate annual debt-to-earnings ratio. The plotted coeffi-
cients are the estimated difference-in-differences across treatment intensity and between each year
and 2010, estimated using Equation 3. These coefficients are presented in Table 1.8. Standard
errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.
completions decline.
I plot the completions response for passing programs at non-passing colleges in
the top two panels of Figure 1.9 and present the coefficients in Table 1.10. I find
evidence of a decline nearly as large as the effect on non-passing programs through
2014. In 2015 and 2016, non-passing programs begin to experience larger comple-
tions declines than these passing programs. To determine the source of these large
responses, I reestimate this DD while excluding colleges that close post-GE proposal.
These results are shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 1.9. The passing program
declines are now less than half as large as before. This is evidence that a substantial
share of these declines are attributable to college closures.
Lastly, I conduct a similar analysis by excluding closures to estimate the effect
of the threat of sanctions at the intensive margin.22 As shown in Figure 1.10 and
Table 1.11, the 2013 enrollment decline at failing colleges is almost 19 percentage
22As with the intensive margin estimation of the response to the GAO report, the sample for this
estimation is different from the baseline.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of the GE Program on Passing Programs at Non-Passing Colleges
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Passing Programs at a Failing College
Failing Programs
Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010. These coefficients are presented
in Table 1.8. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95%

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010. These coefficients are presented
in Table 1.8. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.
points smaller than the baseline estimation, at 7.3%. However, these results suggest
a decline following the GE proposal, as these failing colleges experienced a 6% decline
between 2010 and 2011. The 2013 enrollment decline at warning colleges is 7.4%, only
6 percentage points smaller than the baseline estimate. By 2015, both warning and
failing college enrollment declined by only 18.0% and 18.4% respectively, substantially
smaller than the baseline estimates. This is evidence that post-treatment college clo-
sures account for over three-fourths of the total enrollment decline at warning colleges,
and over four-fifths of the decline at failing colleges. However, the program comple-
tion estimates are similar to the baseline estimates, suggesting a large completions
decline along the intensive margin.
1.7 Aggregate Impact of the Combined Effects
Both the GAO report and the threat of federal student aid sanctions caused signif-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































calculations of the aggregate enrollment responses to determine the contribution of
these policies to the overall enrollment decline in the for-profit sector. I assume that
in the absence of the treatment, treatment colleges would have experienced the enroll-
ment trends experienced by the control colleges. I aggregate the causal effects using
the number and average size of treatment colleges for each piece of federal oversight.
With an 8.6% enrollment decline per for-profit college with a not-for-profit alter-
native, the GAO report resulted in an overall loss of 83,500 for-profit students in 2011.
By 2015 the GAO report is responsible for a loss of nearly 436,000 students. This
accounts for 64% of the total enrollment decline experienced by the for-profit sector
between 2010 and 2015. The 25.9% decline at failing colleges and the 13.7% decline
at warning colleges in 2013 from the threat of sanctions account for 71,000 fewer
students enrolled in the for-profit college sector in that year. By 2015, the aggregate
enrollment loss from the threat of sanctions rises to 356,000 students, accounting for
nearly 77% of the post-2012 for-profit decline.
While these are rough estimates of the aggregate effect, they suggest that the
GAO report and GE proposal together can account for nearly 130% of the for-profit
enrollment losses post-2010. In the absence of both of these effects, the share of
college students attending for-profits may have continued to expand through 2015.
1.8 Conclusion
The for-profit college sector experienced a large enrollment decline beginning in 2010,
losing 33% of 2010 enrollment by 2015. This followed a period of rapid enrollment
growth in the for-profit sector, which often provides worse outcomes to graduates than
colleges in the not-for-profit sectors. I shed light on the causes of this enrollment de-
cline, identifying both an effect of a GAO report and of the threat of federal student
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aid sanctions on for-profit enrollment. Using data from the Department of Education,
I establish differential college- and program-level exposure to each policy and estimate
enrollment and completion responses in a generalized difference-in-differences frame-
work.
I find that both the GAO report and the threat of sanctions caused substantial
enrollment and completion declines at for-profit colleges. The GAO report on for-
profit college practices and costs caused fewer students to attend for-profits with a
local not-for-profit alternative. This led to a 44.8% drop in enrollment at such for-
profit colleges between 2010 and 2015. The threat of federal student aid sanctions
decreased enrollment by 122.3% over the same period at for-profits with high graduate
debt-to-earnings ratios, either due to poorly performing for-profits limiting enrollment
or students avoiding these colleges.
On the aggregate level, I find both pieces of oversight were significant contributors
to the overall for-profit enrollment decline. The enrollment response to the GAO
report accounted for as much as 64% of the enrollment decline at for-profits between
2010 and 2015, while the threat of sanctions accounted for 77% of this decline. In the
absence of both effects, for-profit enrollment may have continued to expand through
the 2015 academic year.
My results demonstrate the considerable influence government oversight has on
for-profit college enrollment. These policies are powerful tools at the disposal of pol-
icymakers interested in limiting enrollment at costly or under-performing for-profit
colleges. Given the recent cancellation of the sanctions program, an interesting ques-
tion going forward is whether the reversal of these policies causes a reversal of the
for-profit enrollment declines. Furthermore, it remains to be seen where for-profit
students went and the outcomes they faced following these pieces of oversight. Such
an analysis opens the door to studying the welfare effects of these government policies.
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2 Analyzing the Higher Education Response to
New Occupational Licensing Requirements
2.1 Introduction
Between 2005 and 2015, the supply of college programs offered in the U.S. grew by
13% and the number of annual college graduations increased by nearly 30%. Over this
same period of growth in higher education, nearly 400 new state-level occupational
licensing requirements were enacted. Does the market for higher education respond
to changes in the labor market caused by new occupational licensing requirements?
Occupational licenses have come under recent scrutiny for creating a barrier to
entry for workers, which may impact employment levels and wages in licensed occu-
pations. Such an impact on labor markets suggest these regulations may have the
power to drive both college and student choices in the market for higher education.
However, whether the labor market response to a new licensing requirement is large
enough to spur changes in the supply of and demand for a college education has not
yet been determined. Establishing the relationship between these regulations and
higher education would shed light on both the responsiveness of colleges and stu-
dents to structural changes in the labor market as well as the full impact of licensing
reglations.
I establish the causal effect of occupational licensing on higher education. Using
state-level data on occupational licensing statutes, I estimate the response of college
completions and the supply of programs to the enactment of new licensing require-
ments in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework. State-level college programs
associated with a newly licensed occupation serve as the treatment group in this
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framework, while programs without a new licensing requirement serve as the control
group. I find that graduations increase by 43% five years after a new statute is en-
acted, and that the supply of college programs increases by 14% in the first three
years post-enactment. Additionally, I find heterogeneous employment responses to
new occupational licensing requirements across occupation educational requirements.
For high-education occupations, I find employment increases that are consistent with
an increase in demand for higher education caused by new licensing requirements.
Occupational licenses are often enacted with the goal of ensuring the quality of
a service or good produced by an occupation. Workers must acquire a license to
work in the occupation, which often involves passing a licensing exam or fulfilling
educational requirements. Despite this, licenses often have little impact on quality
of services provided in the licensed occupations (Kleiner et al. (2016), Kleiner and
Kudrle (2000), Law and Kim (2005)). However, licensing requirements do cause
large changes in the labor market. First, by signaling quality, licenses may raise the
wages earned in licensed occupations (Kleiner and Soltas (2019), Han and Kleiner
(2016), Kleiner and Krueger (2013), Gittleman et al. (2018), Kleiner and Park (2010),
Gittleman and Kleiner (2016)). Second, licenses may create a new barrier to enter
an occupation, leading to reduced levels of employment (Kleiner and Kudrle (2000),
Blair and Chung (2019)). While my results suggest no substantial barrier is created
for high-education occupations, I confirm that employment is reduced by licenses in
occupations requiring a low level of education.
The employment and wage responses to new occupational licensing statutes may
impact the market for higher education. Students choose majors based partly on per-
ceived earnings in related occupations (Wiswall and Zafar (2014)), and when wages
increase in an occupation, related college programs experience an increase in grad-
uations (Long et al. (2015)). This response is small however, as is the increase in
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graduations following employment growth in a related occupation (Grosz (2018), Dil-
lender et al. (2019)). Students also avoid programs when related occupations experi-
ence negative employment shocks (Foote and Grosz (2017), Ersoy (2019)), although
overall college attendance increases during periods of high unemployment (Hubbard
(2018)). Across higher education sectors, for-profit colleges experience the greatest
increase in completions following labor demand shocks when the stock of for-profits is
high, although the entry and exit of for-profits have not been found to be responsive
to such shocks (Armona et al. (2019), Gilpin et al. (2015)). I provide new evidence
that both student completions and the supply of college programs respond to shocks
to the labor market.
Under standard DD assumptions, my analysis provides an estimate of the causal
response to new licensing requirements. The DD framework differences out trends
common to both treatment and control groups caused by non-licensing factors. How-
ever, one concern is that unobservable differences between the treatment and control
groups cause a difference in post-treatment trends unrelated to licenses. I provide ev-
idence that treatment and control groups in each analysis experienced similar growth
prior to the enactment of a new occupational licensing statute, suggesting that treat-
ment and control growth would have remained the same in the absence of a statute.
In the higher education market, I find that new licenses caused the largest in-
creases in completions and programs offered at lower education levels, in programs
that take two-years or less to complete. I further investigate whether this response
differs by sector of higher education. I find that shorter programs experienced both
completions and program growth in the private nonprofit and for-profit sectors, with
for-profit colleges expanding the supply of programs most quickly following enact-
ment. For-profits may expand fastest at this level due to the corporate structure of
many institutions, providing for fewer barriers to opening new programs. For As-
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sociate’s and Bachelor’s degree programs, completion growth occurred only in the
public and for-profit sectors. However, the supply of Bachelor’s programs offered
only expanded in the public sector.
The response of students and colleges are consistent with the estimated response of
employment and wages in newly licensed occupations. For occupations with the lowest
entry-level education, I find that employment declines by 23% in the first four years
post-enactment. I find no change in employment for certificate-level occupations, in
contrast to the estimated increase in certificates earned post-enactment. One possible
explanation for these patterns is that some new licensing statutes for the lowest
education occupations require a college certificate to earn a license. This results in
decreased employment in low-education occupations and an increase in demand for
college certificates.
For occupations with a high entry-education level, I show that employment in-
creased substantially in the years following a new licensing requirement. This growth
was strongest for Associate’s-level occupations, which saw a nearly 20% employment
increase over the first five years post-enactment. These employment increases are
consistent with licenses raising the wages of workers in an occupation, however I find
no evidence of a wage response to new licenses.23 One possible explanation for this
is that the increased supply of workers prevents wages from growing significantly in
the licensed occupation.
My findings establish that occupational licenses impact not only employment, but
also the behavior of both colleges and college students. I show that licenses increase
demand for college programs and that colleges adjust to this demand by supplying
more related degrees. A full accounting of the impact of occupational licenses must
23Continuing workers experience a larger increase in wages than new workers from a licensing
requirement Han and Kleiner (2016).
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consider the additional impacts on higher education.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe
the data used in my analysis. In Section 2.3, I provide a summary of the relationship
between occupational licensing, the labor market, and higher education. I detail my
empirical approach in Section 2.4. I discuss the results in Section 2.5 and conclude
in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data
The data on occupational licenses come from the Northwestern Licensing Database
(NLD).24 This data set contains 2,902 licensing laws enacted at the state and federal
level between 1837 and 2016. Due to limitations in the college data discussed below,
I analyze only the 149 licenses enacted bewteen 2005 and 2014. For each license, the
occupations impacted are identified using the 6-digit U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) Standard Occupational Classification System (SOC). The median number of
occupations regulated by each licensing statute in this sample was 4, with over 25% of
statutes regulating only 1 occupation. The highest number of occupations impacted
by a single licensing law was 60. The total number of occupations licensed over this
time was 164, and 351 unique state-occupation pairs were licensed.
I combine the licensing data with state-level occupational employment and wage
data from the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program. These data
provide total employment as well as the average hourly and average annual wage for
each occupation, estimated annually from 1997 to 2018. Occupations are classified
using 6-digit SOC codes. The 6-digit level identifies occupations such as Dental
Assistants and Bakers. At the 2-digit level, occupations are aggregated into general
occupation groups such as Healthcare Practitioners or Production. In each year of the
24Redbird (2016)
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sample, there are 804 unique 6-digit occupations, with 22 unique 2-digit groupings.
I combine these series with data on the entry-level education of each occupation
provided by the BLS.
The higher education data I use are a panel of colleges from the National Center
for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).
These data are a collection of surveys from all postsecondary institutions receiving
federal student aid each year. The series analyzed in this paper are available beginning
with the 2005-2006 academic year. The completions survey of IPEDS provides data on
the number of graduations at the program-degree level. Programs are classified using
the 6-digit Classification of Instruction Programs (CIP) system. At the 6-digit level,
programs such as registered nursing and licensed nursing are identified. At the 2-digit
level, these programs are grouped into general fields such as health and education.
There are a total of 1,516 6-digit programs and 40 2-digit program groupings. I merge
these data to the OES and NLD data using a CIP-to-SOC code crosswalk provided
by the Department of Education.
As the programs offered in these data are reported when completions occur,
greater-than-one-year programs are offered in years prior to a new non-zero entry
in the data. For instance, a 4-year economics program reporting graduations for the
first time in 2010 would have been first offered in 2007. I determine the years each
program was offered given the length of the degree earned.
2.3 Summary of Occupational Licensing and Higher Educa-
tion
Between 1990 and 2016, 856 new state-level occupational licensing statutes were en-
acted. The majority of these new statutes were enacted prior to 2010, as shown in
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database
Figure 2.1, with a large decline in annual new statutes following the Great Recession.
Every state enacted new licensing statutes during this period, with the fewest new
requirements in Pennsylvania at 7, and the largest number of new licenses in Arizona
with nearly 50.25 Health occupations saw the largest number of new licenses, with
nearly 80 new statutes between 2005 and 2016.26 Other commonly licensed sectors
included business, construction, and health support, as shown in the left panel of
Figure 2.2. The most commonly licensed occupation was genetic counseling with 10
new statutes, and many teaching occupations experienced new licensing requirements
enacted across states as well.27
The number of occupations newly regulated by a licensing requirement varied
considerably over this period. In the right panel of Figure 2.2, I plot the number
25See Figure B.2 in Appendix B.1.
26As discussed in Section 2.2, the sample period used in this analysis spans from 2005-2016.
27I provide the frequency of new licensing statues by 6-digit SOC code in Figure B.1 of Appendix
B.1
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Figure 2.2: Newly Licensed State-Level Occupations
By 2-Digit Occupation Group
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database Note: Occupations are classified using 6-digit SOC codes.
The first panel is limited to the 20 2-digit occupation groups with the largest number of new
licensing requirements.
of 6-digit occupations under a new statute. Over 120 occupations were under a
new licensing requirement in 2013, compared to less than 25 in 2010. Much of this
increase in 2013 is due to a new education-related statute enacted in the states of
Washington and Illinois, regulating nearly all teaching occupations in those states.
Many other licensing requirements enacted over this period were more targeted to a
smaller number of occupations.
Licenses were enacted in both large and small sectors in terms of total employment.
Sectors with the highest shares of licensed employment included those where critical
services are provided, such as the smaller social service sector and the large health
support and health sectors. Sectors with a low share of licensed employment included
large sectors such as administration and production, as well as smaller sectors such as
engineering. Within each of the 2-digit occupation groups, the share of employment
licensed was less than 10% in all sectors in 2010, with the sole exception of social
service.28
28See Figure B.4 and Figure B.5 in Appendix B.1.
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Over the sample period, licensed occupations paid a higher hourly and annual
wage on average.29 Additionally, licensed occupations were larger on average.30 This
may be due to occupations with a high demand for workers, such as those that are
fastest growing, becoming licensed to ensure the quality of a service or good that is in
high demand. However, the high wages may also be due to the occupational licenses
providing a signal of quality, raising the price of the services provided and the wages
earned by those providing the services. This in turn may lead to a higher supply of
workers willing to work in the licensed occupation.
New licensing requirements affected occupations with a higher typical entry level
of education, as shown in Figure 2.3. Over half of all new occupational licensing
statutes between 2005 and 2016 regulated occupations with a college-degree entry
level of education. Over 250 of these required a Bachelor’s degree or higher, while
less than 100 statutes regulated occupations requiring no college education. The level
of education required to work in an occupation may play a large role in whether a new
licensing requirement is a small or substantial barrier to entry for new workers. In a
high-education occupation, workers invest significant time to earn a college degree. A
new license with a licensing exam or educational requirements may not serve as a large
additional requirement on top of the time already invested in a college education. In
this case, many workers would not be deterred from entering the occupation. However,
for low-education occupations, a new licensing requirement may substantially increase
the education and credentialing one must complete to enter the occupation, causing
a decline in workers entering the occupation.
As with occupations, the number of programs related to each new license var-
ied greatly. In Figure 2.4 I plot the number of 6-digit college programs related to
29See Figure B.7 in Appendix B.1.
30See Figure B.6 in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 2.3: New Occupational Licenses by Typical Entry-Level Education,
2005-2016
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, BLS
newly licensed occupations over time. I refer to these as licensed programs for the
remainder of this paper. The trend for licensed programs is similar to that of licensed
occupations, with a decline between 2007 and 2012 and a large increase in 2013 due to
education programs becoming licensed. Education and health programs were the most
licensed 2-digit college programs, with nearly 1,600 programs licensed across states in
the sample period. Military-related programs, as well as communication and liberal
arts, were among the least licensed programs. The most frequently licensed 6-digit
program was science teachers, and teachers for those with special needs was the sec-
ond most licensed set of programs.31 Primarily due to the 2013 education licenses,
Washington, Illinois, and Virginia were the states with the most newly licesned pro-
grams over the sample period.32 In other states, many of the occupational licenses
31See Figure B.10 and Figure B.11 in Appendix B.1.
32See Figure B.12 in Appendix B.1.
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
impacted a smaller number of college programs.
Within each of the 2-digit fields, a small share of graduations were related to
newly licensed occupations. The share of completions within 2-digit fields that were
in licensed 6-digit programs was less than 15% between 2005 and 2016, similar to the
share of employment in licensed occupations in 2010.33 The largest licensed share
was 15% in philosopy, which was a small field with relatively few graduations. The
large fields of business management and health had a 5% share of graduations in
programs related to newly licensed occupations. In 2010, the 2-digit fields with the
largest share of newly licensed programs offered were psychology and construction at
over 9%.34 Business and health also had a relatively high share, between 2-4%, of
offered programs regulated.
Licensed college programs were on average larger, more frequently offered, and less
expensive than unlicensed programs.35 In 2005, the average number of graduating
students per college program was betweeen 40 and 45 in both licensed and unlicensed
33See Figure B.14 and Figure B.15 in Appendix B.1.
34See Figure B.16 and Figure B.17 in Appendix B.1.
35See Figure B.18, Figure B.19, and Figure B.20 in Appendix B.1.
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fields. However, by 2010 and 2015 the average number of graduations in licensed pro-
grams grew to over 100 while unlicensed programs remained smaller. The number of
programs offered in a state on average was between 1 and 1.25 for both licensed and
unlicensed fields in 2005. By 2010, the average number of licensed programs offered
in a state was over 2, and greater than 2.5 by 2013. Programs with many comple-
tions and those offered widely may be related to popular and growing occupations,
however these differences may be due to the occupational license. Lastly, in 2005 and
2010 licensed programs were $2,500-$5,000 less expensive on average to attend than
unlicensed programs. This price differential disappears by 2015.
The reach of occupational licenses was similar across the public, private nonprofit,
and for-profit college sectors. I present the share and number of completions in
licensed programs by sector in Figure 2.5. I present the same summary for the share
and number of programs in Figure 2.6. The share of completions licensed was highest
in the private non-profit sector between 2005 and 2016, however the share in all three
sectors was between 3-4%. The number of completions in licensed programs was the
highest in the public sector, which was signficantly larger than both of the private
higher education sectors.36 While the number of programs licensed was largest in the
public sector in 2010, the share of programs impacted was highest in the for-profit
sector with over 2%. Only 1.5% of public programs and less than 1% of non-profit
programs were linked to licensed occupations.
Lastly, I compare the completions and programs related to newly licensed occu-
pations across degree levels. I again present the share and level of these two series
in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 by degree. The share of graduations in programs related to
licensed occupations was below 4% across all degrees. Less-than-two-year and certifi-
cate programs had the lowest share of completions licensed at 2.5%. The number of
36See Figure B.23 in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 2.5: Completions in Licensed Programs by Sector, 2005-2016
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
Figure 2.6: Programs Licensed by Sector, 2010
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
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Figure 2.7: Completions Licensed by Degree, 2005-2016
Share of Completions in Licensed Programs
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
licensed completions was highest at the Bachelor’s degree level. This pattern reverses
with programs offered, as almost 2% of less-than-two-year and certificate programs
were related to a licensed occupation, while only 1% of Bachelor’s degree programs
were licensed. In levels, Associate’s degrees saw the largest number of offered pro-
grams licensed.
2.4 Methods
I estimate the impact of occupational licensing on both the labor market and the
market for higher education using an event study-style difference-in-difference (DD)
framework. The enactment of a new state-level occupational licensing requirement
serves as a treatment on state-level occupations and programs. The adoption of
these requirements is staggered as the treated occupations and programs experience
treatment across all periods, in contrast to the classic two-period, two-group DD
structure. The control group consists of occupations and programs without a new
licensing requirement in each year, and there exists one control group that is never
treated over the full sample period. The causal impact of new licensing requirements
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Figure 2.8: Share and Number of Programs Licensed by Degree, 2010
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
on the outcomes of interest is the difference in outcomes between treatment and
control groups before and after a licensing requirement is enacted.
I employ a two-way fixed effects regression to estimate the DD:
yi,s,t = αi,s + λt +
d=K∑
d=−K
δdDi,s,t+d + εi,s,t (5)
where yi,s,t is the log outcome of interest for occupation or program i in state s at time
t, Di,s,t+d is an indicator for a unit having a new occupational licensing requirement
at time t+ d for −K ≤ d ≤ K, and αi,s and λt are state-program or state-occupation
and year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is δd, and the causal impact of
occupational licensing on outcome y is the difference between δd and δ0 for each lag
d.
For the difference-in-differences to be the causal impact of the treatment, the
standard DD assumptions must be satisfied. The main identifying assumption is
that treatment and control groups must experience the same growth in outcomes
post-treatment in the absence of the treatment. This counterfactual is unobserved,
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however I test for differences in pre-treatment trends to determine whether treatment
and control groups experienced the same growth in outcomes prior to the treatment.
One may be concerned that occupational licensing requirements are often enacted on
growing occupations. While parallel pre-trends do not definitively satisfy the parallel
trends assumption, they suggest that trends would have continued to be parallel in
the absence of the treatment. As an additional step, I add group-specific linear trend
controls to Equation 5 to remove the bias of a linear trend.
An additional identifying assumption is that the treatment status of the treatment
group must not impact the outcome in the control group. This assumption is violated
if a new licensing requirement in one state causes changes in outcomes in a state
without a new requirement. For instance, a new requirement in one state may cause
workers to move to and enter an occupation in an unlicensed state where there is a
lower barrier to entry. Similarly, a new requirement that raises wages in one state
may pull workers to that state to earn higher wages. While the net impact of such
spillovers is uncertain, licenses have been found to limit migration of licensed workers
(Johnson and Kleiner (2017)). Thus, the estimated causal response of employment
may have a positive bias, as control states experience lower employment due to lower
in-migration.
In higher education, spillovers may occur if changes in demand for workers in
licensed states causes changes in the graduations and programs offered in nearby
states. This effect is particularly a concern for college programs that lead to non-
local jobs, as is the case for many Bachelor’s degree- and graduate-level programs.
However many of the licensed programs provide Associate’s degrees and certificates,
which are more likely to lead to local employment. These shorter degrees are thus
less likely to have a bias from such cross-border spillovers.
I first estimate the impact of occupational licensing on employment and wages,
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as these responses inform the effect on higher education. In this analysis, yi,s,t in
Equation 5 is the log employment or log hourly wage for occupation i in state s
at time t. A new licensing requirement that creates a significant barrier to entry
for new workers in an occupation may cause a decline in employment in the licensed
occupation. Such a barrier to entry may occur due to the licensing requirements being
too difficult or costly to fulfill for some workers. In response, some workers supply
their labor to other occupations, lowering the supply of workers within the licensed
occupation. This lower supply in turn may cause upward pressure on wages in the
licensed occupation. However, an occupational license may also signal an increase in
the quality of the services provided by the occupation. This may lead to an increase
in wages for those working in the occupation, and therefore increase employment as
the supply of workers willing to work in the occupation increases.
I analyze how the labor market response to new licenses varies across entry-
education levels of occupations. The response may vary as the marginal impact of a
new barrier to entry is larger for low education levels and smaller for high levels of
education. A licensing exam is a small additional requirement for a student finishing
four or more years of college, and may be a much larger requirement for those with
no college education. In these specifications of Equation 5, I limit the employment
and wages y to just those of each entry education level.
In my main analysis, I estimate the response of completions and the number of
programs offered to new occupational licensing requirements. In these specifications,
yi,s,t in Equation 5 measures the log number of completions and log number of pro-
grams offered for program i in state s at time t. If a new occupational license provides
a new barrier to entry for workers in a college degree-level occupation, fewer students
may decide to enroll in related college programs and enter that occupation. Lower
demand for these programs may cause a decline in the number of completions and pro-
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grams offered. However, if the license increases wages in an occupation or increases
demand for the service provided, the student demand for related college programs
may increase. Higher demand may cause an increase in the number of completions
and programs offered following enactment.
An additional response may occur if a new license for a non-college-level occu-
pation requires some college education. Prior to the license, few of the workers in
such an occupation attend college. After the new requirement is enacted, demand for
related-college programs may increase, even as the license creates a new barrier to
entry. The number of completions and programs offered may increase in response to
this increase in demand.
I limit the programs in my primary analysis to those with only one occupation
link in the Department of Education CIP-to-SOC code crosswalk. These programs are
directly linked to a specific occupation, and therefore are likely to have a larger share
of students and programs impacted by changes in the labor market. The crosswalk
does not provide information on the number of students in a program that work in
each linked job. Due to the unknown share of students that work in each occupation,
the response in programs linked to multiple occupations may be harder to detect in
these data.
As with the labor market, the response in the market for higher education may
vary by degree-level. Occupational licensing requirements may have the largest impact
at the lowest college education levels for each of the potential responses discussed
above. First, a new barrier to entry may have the largest marginal impact on students
at the lowest degree levels. New certification requirements may be a smaller barrier
for students completing 4-years or more of higher education compared to students
in shorter programs. Second, a wage increase following a new licensing requirement
may increases demand for higher education the most at the lowest degree levels,
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where average pre-license wages are the lowest. Lastly, a license that requires some
college education in a non-college occupation may be most likely to require a low
level education such as a certificate. I estimate the response of higher education
across degrees by limiting y in Equation 5 to completions and programs offered at
each level of education.
The impact of occupational licenses may also vary by higher education sector.
Both the students and the institutions in each sector differ in important ways that
may lead to different responses. For-profit students are often older and from less-
wealthy backgrouns compared to both public and private non-profit students. Pur-
suing an occupational license may be more difficult for for-profit students, who have
more family and career responsiblities, or fewer resources to devote to certification.
An increase in demand for degrees from a new licensing requirement may therefore
be smallest at for-profit institutions. However, on the supply-side, the business-like
structure of many for-profit institutions may allow for a faster response to new li-
censing requirements. The decision to expand class sizes or program offerings may
have fewer barriers for these colleges. Additionally, for-profits can vary the tuition
charged per program while public colleges often must charge one tuition rate across
all programs. In a program that is costly to offer, for-profits may offer more slots in
response to high-demand, when the marginal cost of an additional student is too high
for public colleges.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Labor Market Response to New Occupational Licenses
I present the estimated response of occupational employment to new licensing require-
ments in Table 2.1 by entry-level education and plot these results in Figure 2.9. I
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find that occupations with no education level for typical new hires experience a 19.8%
decline in employment 3 years after enactment, and a 23.1% decline after 4 years. For
occupations with a higher entry level education, I find evidence of employment growth
following the enactment of a new licensing requirement. For Associate’s degree-level
occupations, employment increases by 3.5% in the year of the new licensing require-
ment, and by 19.7% after five years. Employment growth in Bachelor’s degree-level
occupations is smaller, with evidence of an 8.7% increase after four years. Graduate-
level occupations experience nearly a 15% increase in employment five years after
enactment.
I find evidence of parallel pre-trends between the treatment and control groups at
each education level, with the exception of high school-level occupations. While I find
no statistically significant post-treatment trends for these occupations, I find a 17%
increase in employment over four years prior to enactment. Treated Bachelor’s and
Associate’s degree occupations exhibit faster growth 4-6 years prior to the enactment
of a new regulation, however trends are parallel in the 4 years pre-treatment. These
parallel pre-trends provide evidence that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied
and show that on average newly licensed occupations are not faster growing than
non-licensed occupations.
These results suggest that occupational licenses provide the strongest barrier to
entry for occupations with no entry-level education. This is consistent with new
licensing requirements substantially increasing the cost of becoming qualified for these
jobs. The employment increase in high-education occupations is consistent with either
higher wages causing an increase in the supply of workers or higher demand for the
service provided. This is particularly true for Associate’s degree-level occupations,
which experience employment increases of over 40% in the nine years after a new
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control occupation-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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impacted by licenses creating a barrier to entry, any decline in employment is more
than offset by the increases following enactment.
I present the response of hourly wages to new occupational license in Table 2.2
and plot these estimates in Figure 2.10. I find no strong evidence of a wage response
to new licensing requirements. I do find a 5% increase in wages in occupations with
no education level for typical entry-level workers and a 6.4% increase one year after
enactment at the Doctorate level. However, I do not find parallel pre-treatment
trends for no-education occupations, as the treatment group experiences an almost
8% decline in hourly wages during the lead up to licensing.
The lack of an increase in wages for high-education occupations is consistent with
an increase in employment if the higher supply of workers decrease the wage of an
occupation. These two forces counteract each other, resulting in no estimated wage
response to new licensing requirements. However, while the parallel employment pre-
trends suggest that occupations are not licensed in response to fast growth, the results
are consistent with states anticipating faster employment growth in an occupation and
acting to regulate the occupation before the growth occurs.
2.5.2 Higher Education Market Response to New Occupational Licenses
I present the completion response to new licensing requirements in Table 2.3 and plot
the response over time in Figure 2.11. I find a lagged increase in college graduations
following the enactment of a new licensing statute. Four years after enactment,
graduations increase by 35% across all degrees, and by nearly 43% after 5 years.
Programs in the lowest education levels experience the largest increase in graduations
post-enactment. Completions of certificate programs increase by 6.7% in the year
of enactment, and completions in all less-than-two-year programs increase by 5.5%.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control occupation-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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first five years after enactment. Completions in Associate’s degree programs do not
immediately increase, however by the fourth year post-enactment completions are
15% higher. I do not find a statistically significant increase in Bachelor’s degree
completions from a new occupational licensing requirement, although the estimates
follow a similar trend as other degree levels. Looking at all undergraduate degrees,
the five-year increase is 38%, slightly lower than the response of completions in all
college degrees, suggesting that the graduate-level response to licensing is larger than
the undergraduate response. As shown in Figure 2.11, the growth in completions
continue to increase after the 5-year horizon shown in Table 2.3, except for Bachelor’s
degree programs. Additionally, I find evidence of parallel pre-treatment trends for
each education level, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied.
My results show that the employment increase in high-education occupations fol-
lowing a new licensing statute is met with an increase in completions of related pro-
grams. The strongest evidence for this is in Associate’s degree programs, where the
20% increase in employment over 5 years is matched by a 15% increase in graduations.
This is consistent with the new license increasing student demand for Associate’s de-
grees that allow them to work in the licensed occupations. I find no increase in
employment for certificate-level occupations, however the number of graduations in-
crease following enactment, suggesting that demand for these degrees increased. This
is consistent with the decline in no-education occupation employment being caused
by new educational requirements to earn a license. Workers who previously needed no
college education to work in a field are now required to earn a certificate, increasing
demand for certificates in related programs.
The timing of the completions response to new occupational licensing requirements
is consistent with the employment results I find in Section 2.5.1. The largest employ-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
























-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
























-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9






















-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9























-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9























-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Time from New License Requirement
Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
78
coinciding with the increase in all college completions four-years post-enactment.
However, the Associate’s degree employment response occured immediately following
enactment and increased over time, while completions did not increase for four years.
One explanation for this discrepancy is that many workers were already qualified to
work in these positions and supplied labor faster than the market for higher education
adjusted to educate more students.
I present the completions response by higher education sector in Tables B.1, B.2,
and B.3 of Appendix B.2, and plot the results in Figures B.28, B.29, and B.28. I find
that all three higher education sectors experience an increase in graduations following
a new licensing requirement, however the degree-level response varies by sector. My
results show that certificate and less-than-two-year completions increase in only the
private sectors, while Associate’s and Bachelor’s degree completions increase only in
the public and for-profit sectors. These findings may be due to increases in demand
for degrees following new licensing requirements varying by sector or the supply-side
response is of colleges varying by sector.
The certificate and less-than-two-year graduation responses occur in only the pri-
vate non-profit and for-profit sectors. Private certificate programs experience a 23%
increase four years after enactment, and nearly an additional 25% increase four years
later. In the for-profit sector, new occupational licenses cause an increase in com-
pletions of 57% four years after enactment, and an almost 75% increase four years
later. Public certificate and less-than-two-year programs experienced no increase in
completions following enactment.
New licensing statutes only cause an increase in Associate’s degree completions in
the public and for-profit sectors. Public programs experience a 24% increase at four
years, and a further increase of 25% by year 8. This response is very similar to that
observed above in nonprofit and for-profit certificate programs. I find evidence that
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for-profit Associate’s degree programs experience a 36% increase in completions five
years post-enactment, however the response is not statistically significant until the
eighth year post-enactment. This long-term increase in completions is greater than
50%.
Bachelor’s degree programs also experience an increase in completions in both the
public and for-profit sectors, however there was no increase in the private nonprofit
sector. In the public sector, graduations from Bachelor’s degree programs increased
by 21% in the fourth year post-enactment. In the for-profit sector, I find evidence that
Bachelor’s degree completions began to increase in the first two years post-enactment,
and reach an increase of 23% in the third year. However, these for-profit results are
not statistically significant at the 10% level.
I present the response of the number of programs offered to new occupational
licensing requirements at each degree level in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.12.37 I find that
the number of Associate’s degree programs offered increases by 10% three years after
the enactment of a new licensing requirement, and nearly 13% after the first five years
post-enactment. The pre-treatment trend differences between treatment and control
groups is not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the parallel
trends assumption is satisfied. I also find evidence of a 13% increase in the number of
less-than-two-year programs offered after four years. I find no statistically significant
increase in Bachelor’s degree or certificate programs.
I repeat the analysis across higher education sectors and provide the results in
Appendix B.3.38 The increase in programs offered following a new licensing require-
ment in each sector-degree pair closely matches the response I find for completions.
37I exclude graduate programs from these calculations, as the number of years taken to complete
each program is not listed in the data. The response of all degrees and undergraduate degrees are
therefore identical in this set of results.
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The number of certificate and less-than-two-year programs increases in only the for-
profit and private nonprofit sectors. The number of Associate’s degrees offered in
the for-profit and public sectors increases as well. However, I only find new entry of
Bachelor’s degree programs in the public sector following a new licensing statute.
The for-profit sector increases the supply of short programs offered more quickly
than the private nonprofit sector. The number of less-than-two-year programs offered
in the for-profit sector increases by 6% one year after a new licensing requirement,
and by 26% four years post-enactment. The number of certificates programs in this
sector increases by 9% one year after enactment, growing to 12% after four years. In
the private nonprofit sector, the increase in these programs does not occur until an
8-10% increase four years post-enactment.
The supply response of Associate’s degree programs is similar across the public
and for-profit sectors. In the public sector, the number of these programs offered
increases by 14% three years after a new licensing requirement, and by nearly 21%
after five years. In the for-profit sector, the number of Associate’s degree programs
offered increases by 14% four years post-enactment.
The supply of Bachelor’s degree programs only changes following a new licensing
statute in the public sector, despite a completions response in the for-profit sector.
The number of public Bachelor’s programs increases by 4% in the year of enactment,
a response not found in the analysis of all sector programs aggregated together. There
are no further increases in public programs in the years that follow.
My results suggest that both the demand side and supply side of higher education
respond to new licensing requirements, often at the same rate. Licensing requirements
create demand for college education across all degree levels, however the higher educa-
tion sectors experience and respond to this increase in demand differently. For-profits
are able to quickly supply access to short degrees by increasing the number of these
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programs offered, while only public colleges increase the supply of Bachelor’s pro-
grams offered in response to this new demand. The large increase in programs offered
at lower education levels also suggests that these programs do not simply increase
class size to accomodate the new demand for degrees. The increase in Bachelor’s
programs is much smaller than the increase in Bachelor’s completions following en-
actment, suggesting that existing programs in both the public and for-profit sectors
are used to meet the additional demand.
2.6 Conclusion
Occupational licenses have come under scrutiny recently for creating a barrier that
keeps new workers out of an occupation, while often not accomplishing the stated goal
of ensuring the quality of services provided. I examine the impact of new licensing
requirements on both the labor market and the market for higher education.
I confirm that new occupational licenses create a barrier to entry in jobs with the
lowest entry-level education, leading to matching decline in employment. However, I
find that occupations with college-level entry education experience strong employment
growth following a new licensing requirement, with no change in wages. Workers
increase the labor they supply to these newly licensed occupations, potentially due to
higher wages, however the increased supply creates downward pressure on the wages
earned.
In the higher education market, I show that new occupational licensing require-
ments lead to an increase in graduations at all education levels. I further show that
colleges respond to new occupational licenses by expanding the supply of related pro-
grams to meet an increase in demand from students. The response varies by both
education level and sector of higher education. The supply of for-profit certificate
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programs responds faster to new licenses than other programs, while only the public
sector offers new Bachelor’s degree programs in response.
My results show that the impact of occupational licenses is also felt in the mar-
ket for higher education, affecting both supply of and demand for college education.
Colleges are responsive to changes in the labor market that result in increased stu-
dent demand for education, and play an important role in the aggregate response to
occupational licensing requirements.
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3 For-Profit College Program Entry and Exit in
Response to Labor Demand Shocks
3.1 Introduction
The number of colleges and college programs offered in the U.S. each grew by 13%
between 2000 and 2013. Was this substantial growth in the supply of higher education
in part a response to changes in the labor market? Much of this growth occured
in the for-profit higher education sector, which more than doubled the number of
programs offered and accounted for nearly all of the new colleges opened during this
period. Does the for-profit structure of these colleges allow for a higher degree of
responsiveness to labor market conditions? While for-profit colleges face scrutiny
for the high costs and poor labor market outcomes experienced by students, these
institutions may provide valuable access to growing occupations that other sectors of
higher education are slower to supply.
I analyze the higher education response to employment and wage growth across
college sectors. Using college data from the Department of Education and labor
market data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), I estimate the growth in
programs offered and student completions in fields related to growing occupations. I
find increases in both completions and the supply of programs following three years
of employment growth, however these increases occur only in the public and private
nonprofit sector. For-profit colleges do not experience an increase in either series
across all education levels, suggesting that for-profit colleges are not more adaptable
to employment growth than other colleges.
For-profit colleges have been found to provide students with worse employment
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and earning outcomes than similar colleges in other sectors, while being more expen-
sive to attend (Deming et al. (2012), Cellini and Turner (2018), Cellini and Chaudhary
(2014), Lang and Weinstein (2013), Liu and Belfield (2014), Armona et al. (2019)).
Due to these factors, graduates of these colleges often struggle to repay students
loans, defaulting at a higher rate than graduates of public and private nonprofit col-
leges (Looney and Yannelis (2015)). Despite these poor outcomes, the for-profit sector
often claims to provide important access to higher education that public and nonprofit
colleges are unable to supply. This includes providing access to non-typical students,
as students attending for-profits differ in age, family wealth, and other characteristics
from students in the not-for-profit sectors.
While access for underserved communities may be an important contribution of
for-profit colleges, the speed with which access is provided when labor market shocks
occur may also be an important contribution of the for-profit sector. For-profit col-
leges often have a corporate structure, allowing for quicker decision making when of-
fering a new program or opening a new college compared to public colleges that might
need legislative approval. Additionally, many public colleges are limited in how much
tuition can be charged across different programs, while for-profits can discriminate
in pricing given the cost of offering a program. Quickly offering programs following
employment growth would increase access for students to growing occupations in the
labor market.
An increase in the supply of higher education following employment growth in an
occupation may occur due to increased demand for degrees related to the growing oc-
cupation. Following employment growth, a related degree provides a better chance of
employment, a factor taken into consideration by students enrolling in higher educa-
tion (Grosz (2018), Dillender et al. (2019), Foote and Grosz (2017), Ersoy (2019)). A
growing occupation may also provide higher wages for graduates of related programs,
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another factor students consider when choosing a college program to attend (Wiswall
and Zafar (2014), Long et al. (2015)).
While my results show that both graduations and the supply of programs respond
to employment growth, I find no evidence of such growth in the for-profit sector.
This contrasts with previous work on the for-profit graduation response to labor
market shocks, however studies have also found little evidence of for-profit entry
(Armona et al. (2019), Gilpin et al. (2015)). The structure of the for-profit sector may
actually provide for less adaptability to employment growth, as the profit-maximizing
programs may not be those related to growing occupations. On the demand side, for-
profit students may struggle to determine which programs are related to growing
occupations, and therefore be less responsive to employment growth.
Across all sectors of higher education, I find that a 1 percentage point increase
in the occupation share of national employment is associated with a 0.22 percentage
point increase in the college field share of graduations. This response is twice as
large as the average field share of graduations. I find that the field share of programs
offered increases by 0.09 percentage points, a response equal to the average share.
These large responses occur at the Bachelor’s degree and certificate levels of college
education. Associate’s degree programs show no response to employment growth. I
further show that Bachelor’s degree growth occurs in response to employment growth
in occupations with a Bachelor’s degree entry level education. In contrast, certifi-
cate programs do not respond to employment growth in non-degree occupations, and
instead increase only in response to growth in occupations with a higher level of ed-
ucation. This pattern of responses holds in both the public and private nonprofit
sectors.
My results show that the supply of higher education is responsive to changes in
employment and that the for-profit sector is not the most adaptive sector. Adaptabil-
88
ity to the labor market is an important aspect of colleges to consider for policymakers
in higher education. The additional access to growing fields provided by responsive
schools may be particularly important to non-traditional students, to underserved
communities, and during times of high unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide
background on recent trends in colleges, college programs, and completions. I describe
the data used in Section 3.3 and my empirical approach in Section 3.4. I discuss my
findings in Section 3.5 and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
The number of for-profit colleges increased substantially between 2000 and 2013,
growing from 2,400 to over 3,400 institutions. By 2013, there were nearly as many
for-profit institutions as public and private non-profit colleges combined. For-profit
colleges vary greatly, from small establishments with few students enrolled to col-
lege chains owned and operated by large, national education corporations. Between
2013 and 2015, the number of for-profit colleges fell by 200, as the sector received
renewed public and government scrutiny for the poor outcomes students face and the
misleading recruiting practices employed by some institutions.
As with the number of for-profit institutions, the number of for-profit programs
offered expanded rapidly from 11,650 in 2005 to 17,000 in 2011. These programs
constituted a smaller share of total programs offered across all sectors however, as
the public and private nonprofit sectors offered 67,550 and 34,000 programs in 2011,
respectively. This is due to many four-year public and nonprofit colleges institutions
offering a large selection of programs. Public programs were evenly split between
Bachelor’s degree, Associate’s degree, and certificate programs, while 90% of private
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nonprofit programs were at the Bachelor’s degree level. In contrast, nearly half of for-
profit programs offered were certificate programs, with only 20% of programs offered
at the Bachelor’s degree level.
The corporate or business-like structure of for-profit colleges may provide this sec-
tor with a more responsive supply of programs compared to the public and private
non-profit sectors. The decision to offer a new program, or even open a new estab-
lishment, may have fewer barriers compared to a public institution, where the state
bureacracy or legislature may be involved. The ability to charge varied tuition across
programs, given the cost of education a student, may also allow for-profits to provide
access to in-demand degrees that other sectors are unable to provide
The number of students graduating annually from for-profit colleges increased
substantially bewtween 2005 and 2013 as well. In 2005, 530,000 students completed a
for-profit degree, while in 2013 there were 777,800 for-profit completions. These com-
pletions comprised the smallest share of graduations by sector nationally, as there
were over 2.9 million public graduations and over 1 million private nonprofit gradu-
ations in 2013. As with the number of programs offered, nearly half of all for-profit
completions were in certificate programs, with the other half of completions split
equally between Bachelor’s and Associate’s degree programs. Nearly half of all pub-
lic completions were in Bachelor’s degree programs, as were two-thirds of all private
nonprofit completions.
The type of students that attend for-profit colleges differ in important ways from
students in other sectors, which may impact the demand for education from for-profit
colleges. These students are often older and come from less-wealthy backgrounds
than students in public and private non-profit colleges. Many for-profit students have
already entered the labor force, or started a family, and are entering higher education
to change careers. Such students may respond to labor market growth differently than
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not-for-profit students, leading to different demand for growing occupations across
sectors. Additionally, the high cost of for-profit programs relative to not-for-profit
programs may attract fewer students despite labor market growth, and the stigma of
the for-profit sector may push students toward other sectors as well. Thus, while the
structure of for-profits may allow for a faster response to increases in demand, demand
may be slower to increase for a for-profit education than a not-for-profit education.
3.3 Data
For data on completions and number of programs, I use the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) from the National Center for Education Statistics.
These data are a panel of all institutions of higher education in the U.S. that are
eligible for federal student aid. The data include the number of completions at the
program level, the degree and length of programs, and the sector of colleges. Other
characteristics of colleges and programs provided in these data include the cost of
attendance and location.
Programs are identified using 6-digit Classification of Instruction Programs (CIP)
codes. These codes distinctly identify 1,516 programs such as licensed nursing and
registered nursing at the 6-digit level. At the 2-digit level, programs are organized into
40 broad categories such as health, education, and business. For the remainder of this
paper, I refer to the 2-digit and 6-digit programs as fields, and the individual programs
offered by colleges as programs. For instance, economics at Boston University is a
single program offered in the economics field.
The data on occupation-level employment and wages come from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statisticis (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program. An-
nual employment, average hourly wage, and average annual wage are estimated from
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1997 to 2018. Occupations are identified using 6-digit BLS Standard Occupational
Classification System (SOC) codes. There are 804 unique 6-digit occupations, such
as Dental Assistants. Occupations are aggregated into 22 2-digit groupings, such as
Legal Occupations and Healthcare Support Occupations. I match these data with
required entry-level education data also provided by the BLS. I further combine the
occupation labor market data and the college program data using a Department of
Education CIP-to-SOC code crosswalk.
3.4 Methods
College graduations and the supply of college programs may both respond to employ-
ment growth in the labor market. As some students look for education that leads to
employment in a growing occupation, graduations in related fields increase. Exist-
ing college programs may have excess capacity able to satisfy an increase in demand,
however, on the extensive margin the number of programs supplied may also increase.
I first analyze the response to occupational employment growth across all sectors
of higher education. I estimate the impact of lagged occupational employment growth
on the share of completions and programs offered in related fields using the following
equation:
yi,t = αi + λt + δDi,t,t−3 + εi,t (6)
where αi and λt are program and year fixed effects, and Di,t,t−3 is the change in the
share of employment related to field i between time t− 3 and time t. The coefficient
of interest is δ, which measures the responsiveness of the outcome yi,t to employment
growth for field i at time t. When estimating the completions response to employment
growth, yi,t measures the share of national graduations that occured in field i. For
the change in the supply of programs, yi,t measures the share of all programs offered
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nationally that are in field i.
Estimating the response of the share of completions and programs controls for
trends impacting all college fields independent of occupation-specific growth. As
discussed in Section 3.2, higher education experienced periods of both strong growth
and decline during the sample period. One particular concern is the Great Recession
period, when the opportunity cost of a college education decreased and enrollment
expanded rapidly. Such trends may cause a negative correlation between employment
growth and completions or programs. However, the relative size of programs related
to growing occupations during this time may still increase if students and colleges
respond to such growth. I provide additional esitmates of the log and level response
of completions and programs to employment growth in Appendix C.1. Similarly,
measuring employment growth using the share of total employment related to field i
controls for national employment trends in each period.
I run additional specifications of Equation 6 limiting the completions and programs
to just those belonging to a specific degree levels. These degree levels are undergrad-
uate, Bachelor’s, Associate’s, less-than-two-year, and certificates. The entry response
may vary by degree, for instance if shorter programs have lower start-up costs for
new offerings or Bachelor’s programs have a greater existing capacity available.
To investigate whether the for-profit sector responds faster to labor market changes
than other sectors, I estimate Equation 6 with employment growth interacted with
each sector of higher education. As discussed in Section 3.2, the response to labor
market changes may differ by sector due to differences in the structure of institutions
in each sector. These estimates will provide insight into the adaptability of each
sector of higher education.
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3.5 Results
I first estimate the response of graduations by degree level. As shown in Table 3.1, fol-
lowing a 1 percentage point increase in related occupation share of total employment,
the completion share of a field increases by 0.22 percentage points nationally. This
growth is nearly double the average completion share across fields, and one-fifth of
the 99th percentile of programs. These large increases occur in Bachelor’s degree and
certificate programs, but there is no graduation response at the Associate’s degree
level. The largest response is in less-than-two year programs, where the graduations
share increases by 0.3 percentage points. Bachelor’s degree completion shares increase
by a smaller 0.25 percentage points. Additionally, the response for all undergraduate
programs is smaller than that of all programs, suggesting an increase in graduation
shares occurs at the graduate-degree level as well.
The lack of a completions response at the Associate’s degree level may be due to
the type of programs offered and the related occupations at this level. Employment
growth in related occupations may lead to little increased demand for related pro-
grams. Alternatively, Associate’s degree programs may be the least able to respond
to shocks in demand due to capacity constraints. Individual programs may typically
be filled close to capacity and therefore unable to accept many new students, whereas
other degree-levels have more empty seats available to fill. On the extensive margin,
there may be more barriers to opening new Associate’s degree programs that prevent
colleges from expanding supply to meet student demand.
I provide results for alternative specifications using log employment and log com-
pletions as well as levels in Appendix C.1.39 I find no evidence of a percentage increase
in completions in these specifications, however I find evidence of an increase in the















































































































































































































































































































number of graduations in less-than-two-year and non-degree programs. This suggests
that growth in graduations occurs in large programs, providing only a small per-
centage increase with no increase in smaller fields. Non-degree graduations increase
by 2,800 following a 1 percentage point increase in related employment share, and
increase by 100 following a 1% increase in related employment.
I investigate whether the completion response depends on employment growth
at similar levels of education or for related occupations of all education levels. For
example, the registered nursing field is linked to both occupations with a Bachelor’s
degree entry-level education and occupations with an Associate’s degree-level educa-
tion. An increase in registered nursing Bachelor’s degrees may depend only on growth
in the Bachelor’s-level occupation, or may respond to overall growth across all linked
occupations regardless of education level.
To answer this question, I limit employment growth to those occupations with a
typical entry-level education matching the degree level of the completions. In Table
3.2, I present these results across education levels. This specification confirms the
baseline results, as graduation shares increase by 0.26 percentage points following a
1 percentage point increase in employment share. This growth occurs exclusively in
Bachelor’s degree programs, while graduations in certificate programs no longer in-
crease. This suggests that an important contributor to the positive non-degree com-
pletions response in the baseline results is growth in related occupations with a high
entry-level education. However, Bachelor’s degree completions are as responsive to
Bachelor’s-level employment as to employment aggregated across degree levels. This
suggests that the share of Bachelor’s degrees earned grows in response to Bachelor’s-
level employment growth, and is not impacted by growth in occupations of a lower
entry-level education.40


























































































































































































































































































































































































I find that graduation increases occur in both the public and private non-profit
higher education sectors, however I find no statistically significant response in the for-
profit sector. These results are reported in Table 3.3. Public Bachelor’s degree and
certificate programs experience a 0.40 percentage point or greater increase in grad-
uation shares following a 1 percentage point increase in related employment shares.
Private non-profit Bachelor’s degree completions also respond to related employment
growth with a 0.24 percentage point increase in graduation shares. Associate’s de-
gree completions do not respond to employment growth in any of the higher education
sectors. Additional specifications using log completions and log employment growth
confirm that graduation growth occured in only the public and private non-profit sec-
tors, as presented in Appendix C.1.41 These additional specifications provide some
evidence of a graduation decline in private non-degree programse. This may be evi-
dence of private non-profit colleges shifting students to higher degree programs related
to an occupation and away from non-degree programs related to that same occupa-
tion. This may also occur due to students themselves switching to higher degree
levels.
I again investigate whether sector-specific completions are more responsive to
employment at similar levels of education than to overall employment. I match occu-
pation education level to completion degree level, now by sector of higher education.
I present the results in Table 3.4. I confirm the baseline results, as Bachelor’s degree
completions respond to Bachelor’s level employment and certificate completions show
no response to certificate-level employment growth. The private nonprofit and public
sectors remain the only sectors with a completions response to employment growth.
However, I find no response in log completions, again suggesting these increases occur in the programs
with the most aggregate completions nationwide. See Tables C.5, C.6, C.7, and C.8 of Appendix
C.1.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The sector-specific estimates do not provide evidence that for-profits are more
nimble and more adaptable to changes in the labor market. Public and private
non-profit college graduation levels adjust to labor market employment growth while
for-profits do not gain graduations in programs related to growing occupations. These
changes may be driven by student choice on the demand side, as students choose not-
for-profit colleges to attend to gain access to growing occupations. One reason for
such a choice may be the much higher costs of attending a for-profit college. Students
may also avoid for-profit colleges due to the increasingly negative stigma attached to
these institutions
The national share of programs offered related to growing occupations increases
by 0.09 percentage points following a 1 percentage point increase in employment
shares. This increase is twice as large as the average share of programs across fields,
and 10% of the 99th percentile share. As shown in Table 3.5, this response occurrs
exclusively at the Bachelor’s degree level. Therefore, the increase in Bachelor’s degree
completions found above occurs as new programs are offered, while the increase in
non-degree completions occurs in existing programs. One might expect the startup
costs associated with new Bachelor’s programs to be significantly larger than those
for shorter certificate programs, thus the estimated response may be due instead to
the type of occupation growing at each education level. At the Bachelor’s degree
level, occupational growth may occur in new fields without many existing programs
or in fields that are not widely offered. At the certificate level, employment growth
may mainly occur in fields with many existing programs offered. Thus, certificate
graduations increase while the number of programs offered does not increase.42
42I provide alternative specifications of the change in the log and level of programs in Tables C.17,
C.18, C.19, and C.20 of Appendix C.1. The log number of programs does not increase following
an increase in the employment share of related occupations, and there is a large decline in the log
number of non-degree programs. This may be picking up general trends across programs in number












































































































































































































































































































Matching occupation entry-level education to program degree levels, I confirm the
baseline results, as shown in Table 3.6. I find a 0.14 percentage point increase in the
share of Bachelor’s degree programs offered when the employment share of related
Bachelor’s level occupations increases by 1 percentage point.43 As with completions,
this suggests that the supply of Bachelor’s degree programs responds to growth in
occupations with a similar education level.
Returning to the cross-sector analysis, I find that the program supply response
occurs only in the public and private non-profit sectors, as shown in Table 3.7. The
program share does not increase for for-profit programs, while the public program
share increases by 0.14 percentage points and the nonprofit share increases 0.15 per-
centage points. This growth occurs solely in Bachelor’s degree programs, matching
the aggregate results above. Associate’s degree programs do not respond in any of the
higher education sectors, however the share of private non-profit certificates programs
declines by 0.032 percentage points following employment growth.
Bachelor’s degree programs in both the public and private non-profit sectors re-
spond to growth in Bachelor’s-level employment. I present these degree-matched
results in Table 3.8. I find that the supply of private non-degree programs do not
decline in response to non-degree employment growth, in contrast with the response
to occupational employment growth at all degree levels. These results show that non-
profit certificate programs exit following growth in related high-education occupations
and do not enter in response to low-education occupational employment growth. This
is consistent with private nonprofit colleges shifting resources to offer more Bachelor’s
degree programs related to a growing occupation and away from non-degree programs
related to the same occupation.
In alternative specifications, I use the log and level number of programs offered

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as the outcome yi,t in Equation 6. With these specifications, I find evidence that the
for-profit sector responds to changes in employment.44 Following a 1 percentage point
increase in employment share, the number of for-profit Bachelor’s degree programs
offered increased by 3.24% or an average of 68 additional programs. Additionally,
this specification shows no growth for public and private non-profit Bachelor’s degree
programs. However, as the share of for-profit Bachelor’s degree programs does not
similarly increase in the baseline specification, this estimate may be confounded by
growth in for-profit Bachelor’s programs unrelated to occupation-specific employment
growth.
My results suggest for-profits are not more adaptable to labor market conditions
than public and private nonprofit colleges. The profit incentives may cause for-profits
to offer profit maximizing programs, which may not be the same as those that are
fastest growing. Such a disparity could arise due to for-profit student misinformation
about labor market outcomes or efforts by for-profits to mislead students. However,
this lack of a supply response may be due to no increase in demand from students for
for-profit programs. The supply of public and private non-profit programs increases
following occupational employment growth, mirroring the growth of graduations in
these two sectors. This growth in public and private programs may be what allows
students to choose these colleges over for-profit colleges when enrolling.
3.6 Conclusion
The influence of for-profit colleges on higher education has increased substantially,
growing from serving 5% of all colleges students in 2000 to a high of 11% by 2010.
The business-like structure of for-profit institutions and the ability to vary tuition by
program have been suggested as reasons for-profits may be more adaptable to changes
44See Tables C.25-C.32 in Appendix C.1.
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in the labor market. I examine whether the for-profit sector responds more quickly
to employment growth than the public and private nonprofit sectors.
I find that both graduations and the number of programs offered in the for-profit
sector do not respond to employment growth in related occupations. I show that
public and private non-profit colleges experience increases in both graduations and
programs following such employment growth. These graduation increases occur only
in Bachelor’s degree and ceritificate programs, while only the number of Bachelor’s
degree programs offered respond to employment growth.
While for-profits may face fewer barriers to entry than public and private non-
profit institutions, this does not result in increased responsiveness to occupational
employment growth. In fact, for-profit colleges are less responsive to occupation-
specific employment growth than other sectors, suggesting the for-profit sector is
uniquely less adaptable to employment growth in the labor market.
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Appendix A Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1 Treatment Effects on Cost of Attendance
As an additional test for confounding post-treatment trends, I estimate the DD of
the cost of attendance between treatment and control groups for each treatment. I
estimate Equation 3 with the annual cost of attendance now serving as the outcome
of interest, yi,t. The differences in coefficients relative to the last pre-treatment period
are plotted in Figure A.1. I find no statistically significant difference in costs between
for-profits with and without alternatives at both the college and program levels in
the post-treatment periods. The estimated differences between the coefficients are
also less than 2% in each year. These results provide evidence that there are no
confounding trends correlated with the cost of attendance between for-profits with
and without alternatives. The results are similar for the threat of sanctions at the
college level, with no statistically significant differences until 2016 and all estimated
differences close to zero. However, I do find statistically significant differences at
the program level. These differences are a continuation of a relative decline in costs
at failing and warning for-profit programs, beginning in 2010 when the GE rules
are announced. While this trend may be due to unexplained differences between the
treatment and control colleges, such a decline may also reflect the efforts of for-profits
with high debt-to-earning ratios to lower the cost of attendance and therefore lower
graduate debt levels.
A.2 Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
I supplement my analysis of the enrollment response to the GAO report by estimat-
ing the effect in a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) framework. The DDD
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Figure A.1: Difference in Cost of Attendance betweeen Treatment and Control
Groups
For-Profit Colleges with an Alternative





















































For-Profit Programs with an Alternative




































































































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences of annual costs of atten-
dance between treatment and control colleges and between each year and the last post-treatment
year, estimated using Equation 3. Costs are the annual tuition and fees reported per college or
per program when data are available. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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allows me to difference out both the effect of being a for-profit institution and the
effect of having a not-for-profit alternative from the causal estimate. As shown in
subsection 1.5.2, public colleges did not experience an enrollment decline caused by
the GAO report, and private nonprofit colleges experienced a smaller enrollment and
completions decline than that of the for-profit sector. These results suggest there
were no confounding trends related to having a not-for-profit alternative independent
of the GAO report. This DDD exercise provides additional evidence of no such con-
founding trends. I estimate the difference between for-profits with an alternative and
not-for-profits with an alternative and for-profits without an alternative before and
after the GAO report. The regression specification becomes








i +Xi,tβ + εi,t (7)
where Fi is an indicator for whether college i is a for-profit college. I control for the
same set of covariate trends Xi,t as in the main specifications.
I present the DDD estimatess in Figure A.2 and Table A.1. These results con-
firm the findings discussed in subsection 1.5.2. The post-treatment declines in each
specification are statistically significant and robust to a linear trend. In 2011, the
GAO report caused a 9.6% enrollment decline when triple differencing using public
colleges and a 7.2% decline when using private nonprofit colleges. These are both
similar to the baseline DD estimate of 8.1%, however the smaller DDD estimate us-
ing private nonprofits again suggest that these colleges experienced a decline from
the GAO report. This also confirms that the effect on for-profit colleges was larger
than the potential effect on private nonprofit colleges. This pattern is repeated at
the program level, with both DDD specifications providing a 2011 estimate near the
13.7% DD estimate. By 2015, the effect of the GAO report grows close to a 45%
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Figure A.2: Effect of the GAO Report using Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences























































































































































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and between each year and 2010, estimated using Equation 7. These coefficients
are presented in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































enrollment decline in both DDD specifications, mirroring the 44.6% baseline result.
At the program level, the DDD provides causal 2015 completion declines larger than
the baseline DD 35.3% estimate.
A.3 Supplementary Figures and Tables



























































Source: Google Trends (https://www.google.com/trends) Note: August 3rd, 2010 is the date the
Government Accountability Report was released.





















































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and between each year and 2010. These coefficients are presented in Table 1.3.
Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.
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College FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes
Linear Trend No Yes
Observations 28,334 28,334
R2 0.208 0.208
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the effect of the GAO report over time are the difference in log trends between
for-profits with and without alternatives. The covariate trends controlled for are GE status, cost of
attendance, location type, program length, college size, lagged enrollment and completions growth,
and state-level employment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010. These coefficients are presented
in Table 1.8. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.














































































































Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control colleges and programs and between each year and 2010. These coefficients are presented
in Table 1.8. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-zone level. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the treatment.
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Table A.3: Effect of the Gainful Employment Program on Aggregate College
Completions
Warning Colleges Failing Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δt - δ2012
2005 0.038 0.126** 0.182* 0.218***
(0.091) (0.056) (0.099) (0.067)
2006 0.056 0.130** 0.143 0.173***
(0.090) (0.058) (0.091) (0.061)
2007 0.041 0.106* 0.116 0.142**
(0.089) (0.064) (0.092) (0.064)
2008 0.045 0.099 0.075 0.098
(0.085) (0.064) (0.096) (0.070)
2009 0.098 0.138** 0.072 0.089
(0.073) (0.058) (0.096) (0.077)
2010 0.066 0.094 -0.017 -0.003
(0.073) (0.063) (0.096) (0.082)
2011 0.045 0.060 0.016 0.025
(0.059) (0.054) (0.077) (0.071)
2013 -0.222*** -0.231*** -0.464*** -0.469***
(0.080) (0.083) (0.107) (0.109)
2014 -0.554*** -0.575*** -0.957*** -0.967***
(0.134) (0.135) (0.155) (0.164)
2015 -0.584*** -0.617*** -1.267*** -1.282***
(0.180) (0.178) (0.195) (0.211)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,355 28,355 28,355 28,355
R2 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the threatened sanctions effect over time are the difference in log trends between
non-passing and passing for-profits. The covariate trends controlled for are alternative-existence,
cost of attendance, location type, program length, college size, lagged enrollment and completions





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6: Spillovers of the Gainful Employment Program on Passing Program
Completions: Non-Passing Programs
Full Sample Excluding College Closures










2005 -0.052 0.079 -0.075 -0.058
(0.073) (0.122) (0.083) (0.130)
2006 0.036 0.139 0.020 0.016
(0.083) (0.102) (0.080) (0.111)
2007 0.007 0.192* -0.009 0.074
(0.077) (0.102) (0.073) (0.112)
2008 0.041 0.183 0.012 0.053
(0.081) (0.113) (0.074) (0.102)
2009 0.044 0.089 0.062 -0.026
(0.082) (0.101) (0.072) (0.088)
2010 0.026 0.016 0.023 -0.039
(0.066) (0.095) (0.064) (0.087)
2011 0.084* 0.007 0.085* -0.020
(0.048) (0.045) (0.051) (0.046)
2013 -0.118** -0.213*** -0.080* -0.264***
(0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.054)
2014 -0.296*** -0.349*** -0.172*** -0.386***
(0.085) (0.080) (0.066) (0.067)
2015 -0.389*** -0.619*** -0.273*** -0.500***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.087) (0.075)
College FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariate Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133,912 133,912 106,053 106,053
R2 0.205 0.205 0.125 0.125
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimates of the threatened sanctions effect over time are the difference in log trends across av-
erage graduate annual debt-to-earnings ratios. The covariate trends controlled for are alternative-
existence, cost of attendance, location type, program length, college size, lagged enrollment and
completions growth, and state-level employment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the
commuting-zone level.
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Appendix B Chapter 2 Appendices
B.1 Supplemental Descriptive Graphs
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Figure B.1: Most Licensed 6-Digit Occupations, 2005-2016
0 2 4 6 8 10

























Spcl Ed Teach. Pre
Scpl Ed Teach. PS
Spcl Ed Teach. HS
Spcl Ed Teach. MS









Source: Northwestern Licensing Database
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Figure B.2: New Occupational Licenses by State, 2005-2016
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database
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Figure B.3: Licensed Occupations by State, 2005-2016
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, BLS
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Figure B.4: Licensed Employment by 2-Digit Occupation
Licensed Share of Employment
0 .05 .1










































Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, BLS
Figure B.5: Total Employment by 2-Digit Occupation, 2005-2016
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, BLS























































Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, BLS
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Figure B.8: Average Hourly Wage by 2-Digit Occupation, 2005-2016
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Figure B.9: Average Annual Wage by 2-Digit Occupation, 2005-2016
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Figure B.10: Most Frequent 2-Digit College Programs Linked to Newly Licensed
Occupations
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
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Figure B.11: Most Frequent 6-Digit College Programs Linked to Newly Licensed
Occupations
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
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Figure B.12: College Programs Linked to Newly Licensed Occupations by State
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
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Figure B.13: Average Tuition by 2-Digit Program, 2005-2016
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Figure B.14: Share and Number of Completions Licensed by 2-Digit Program
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Source: Northwestern Licensing Database, IPEDS
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Figure B.15: Completions by 2-Digit Program, 2005-2016
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Figure B.16: Share and Number of Programs Licensed by 2-Digit Program, 2010
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Figure B.17: Total 6-Digit Programs Offered by 2-Digit Program, 2010
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Figure B.19: Average Number of Programs Offered per 6-Digit Program Across
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Figure B.21: Total 6-Digit Programs Offered by Sector, 2005-2016
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Figure B.22: Total 6-Digit Programs Offered by Sector, 2010
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Figure B.23: Total 6-Digit Completions Offered by Degree, 2005-2016
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Figure B.24: 6-Digit Programs Offered by Degree, 2010
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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Note: The plotted coefficients are the estimated difference-in-differences between treatment and
control program-states and between each lag and the base year, estimated using Equation 5.
These coefficients are presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line denotes the timing of the
treatment.
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